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ARTICLE
SHOULD LAW SCHOOLS TEACH
PROFESSIONAL DUTIES, PROFESSIONAL
VIRTUES, OR SOMETHING ELSE?
A CRITIQUE OF THE CARNEGIE
REPORT ON EDUCATING LAWYERS
W. BRADLEY WENDEL*
INTRODUCTION
There has been a lot of talk lately in the legal education literature about
"professional identity" and "professional formation," in addition to that
hardy perennial, "professionalism." Arguably, this may be a propitious mo-
ment to reconsider the subject of professionalism education because the
American Bar Association (ABA) Standards Review Committee has pro-
posed evaluating law schools on, among other criteria, how well graduates
demonstrate competence in "the exercise of professional judgment consis-
tent with the values of the legal profession and professional duties to soci-
ety"' and "knowledge, understanding and appreciation of' various
professional values.2 This recommendation follows on the report of the Car-
negie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, which faulted ethics
teaching in law schools for emphasizing the law of lawyering over "its ap-
prenticeship of professional identity."3 Legal education as it is currently
practiced suffers from a preoccupation with "the procedural and formal
qualities of legal reasoning" to the exclusion of "the moral and social
dimensions."' Law schools must therefore keep the analytical and the moral
in dialogue.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. See Proposed Standard 302(b)(2)(ii), 2011 A.B.A. Svc. LFGAI Enuc. & ADMISSIONS TO
iHE BAR, STANDARoS REV. COMM.
2. Id. Proposed Standard 302(b)(4).
3. See WIi 1IAM M. SUI IIVAN FT AT., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THF PRO-
FESSION OF LAW 128 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORI].
4. Id. at 145.
5. Id. at 142.
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The claim of my contribution to this symposium on professional edu-
cation is that moral and social dimensions of legal reasoning are already
embedded within legal reasoning. Legal practice can best be understood as
a craft-that is, a distinctive way of doing something called deliberation,
practical reasoning, or the exercise of judgment.' The Carnegie Report de-
scribes three distinct kinds of competence that practitioners must possess.
The first is formal or theoretical knowledge. For lawyers this means legal
analysis: "the categorizing and grasping of particular matters in terms of
general principles and doctrines."' Critically, however, formal knowledge is
not prior to practice; rather, it gains content and intelligibility only in the
context of practical engagement with the problems of clients.' From the
outset there is no way to separate theoretical and practical modes of under-
standing. The late philosopher of education Donald Sch5n contends that a
great deal of professional knowledge is best understood not as "knowing
that" but rather as "knowing how." That is, much of what professionals do
involves tacit knowledge, which shows up in patterns of action but is diffi-
cult to describe. He observes: "Every competent practitioner . . . makes
innumerable judgments of quality for which he cannot state adequate crite-
ria, and he displays skills for which he cannot state the rules and proce-
dures."9 Legal education must therefore be concerned with imparting this
kind of practical knowledge that cannot be reduced to abstract theoretical
considerations.
A reader of the Carnegie Report who is concerned with legal ethics
would be pleased to note the attention given to "wider issues, many of
which would be understood as moral or ethical matters in everyday under-
standing or in philosophical discourse."10 The Report calls upon law
schools to take up the challenge of educating lawyers to "strengthen the
profession's sense of public purpose."" It is hard to disagree with this rec-
ommendation, but it is important that legal educators should not overdraw
the distinctions made in the Carnegie Report between the cognitive expert
knowledge and identity-and-purpose apprenticeships that comprise legal ed-
ucation. 12 Professional identity for lawyers simply is performing the com-
plex task of representing clients effectively within the bounds of the law.
The principal target of the argument in this paper is the dichotomizing ten-
6. For the argument that ethical lawyering is fundamentally a matter of excellence in practi-
cal deliberation, see ANIHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LosL LAWYER (1993). A less well known, but
an elegant argument for a similar conception of the virtues of legal practice, is JACK L. SAMMONS,
JR., LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1988).
7. CARNEGm REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
8. Id. at 117-18.
9. DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACIIONER: How PROFESSIONALs THINK IN Ac-
LION 49-50 (1983).
10. CARNEGm REPORT, supra note 3, at 129.
11. Id. at 30.
12. Id. at 28.
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dency one sometimes observes, separating positive law and legal practice
from concerns about ethics and social justice. The Carnegie Report provides
one causal explanation in terms of the prestige enjoyed by the institution of
the German university in the Nineteenth Century, which was based on the
university's claim to be a center of value-neutral technical expertise." Le-
gal education, which had formerly been conveyed through Abraham Lin-
coln-style apprenticeships, aspired to the prestige of the university and
therefore developed its own conception of "scientific," and hence value-
free, expertise, personified forever after in Christopher Columbus Lang-
dell.14 Historically, professional prestige and the respectability of a practical
discipline can be traced back to its epistemological foundations.'" Law
schools could seek prestige on the same terms as other departments of the
university rather than being looked down upon as "trade schools."' 6 In ad-
dition, the dichotomizing tendency has its roots in a basic jurisprudential
mistake. Positive law is sometimes misunderstood as morally neutral so that
representing clients within the bounds of the law is itself a morally neutral
activity." This jurisprudential confusion has led to a substantial debate
within the field of academic legal ethics, defending or criticizing the notion
that pursuing the interests of one's client through lawful means is a morally
valuable thing to do; this debate gains traction in the first place only if it is
assumed that the law and morality are separate domains."
The central normative problem of legal ethics would arise in a differ-
ent way, however, if one began with a different foundational assumption
about the morality of law. That is, if it were assumed that there is something
morally valuable about the rule of law itself, then the moral significance of
the work of lawyers could be understood derivatively as contributing to the
functioning of a legal system that possesses the virtues associated with le-
gality. One might argue, for example, that legal reasoning underwrites a
13. Id. at 4-5; see also MAGAL SARIAIn LARSON, THEF RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A Socio-
I OGICAI ANALYSIs 22, 40-42 (1977).
14. See generally ROBER STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCAnION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO TmnE 1980s (1983) (giving an excellent history of the evolution of American legal educa-
tion from an informal apprenticeship to a program of study within the university).
15. See TFRENcE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRiSES, AND PROFES-
SIONAL EMPownRMFNT 40 (1987).
16. As Langdell said, "If law be not a science, a university will best consult its own dignity
in declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be learned
by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices." STnvNS, supra note 14, at 52.
17. The Carnegie Report makes a common mistake when it equates legal positivism, which
is the thesis of the analytic separability of law, with logical positivism, which is a set of claims
about language, meaning, and knowledge. See id. at 5 (blurring these lines); John Passmore, Logi-
cal Positivism, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 52, 52-57 (1967) (describing logical
positivism); JOSEPH RAZ, TI AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 45-52
(1979) (defending the thesis that legal positivism is the position that the content and existence of a
law can be determined without using moral arguments).
18. See W. BRADLFY WENDEL, LAWYFRS AND FIDELITY To LAW 17-48 (2010) (providing an
overview of this debate).
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distinction between raw power and rightful power, which is of the utmost
importance in a society characterized by diversity, moral pluralism, and
conflict. It is therefore a conceptual mistake to believe that issues of social
responsibility are somehow external to law or that law is merely a tool that
may be used, for good or for ill, and that lawyers need to be told to use it
for good. While I would not go quite as far as the great English historian
E.P. Thompson and say the rule of law is "an unqualified human good,"' 9 I
do believe the difference between arbitrary power and lawful power is an
extremely important one and that the rule of law establishes a moral rela-
tionship between citizens and government. 20 If legally constrained reason-
ing has the capacity to regularize, and therefore make more just the use of
power in society, then there would be moral significance to simply doing
what lawyers do, provided of course that they do it properly.
If this is the case, then the ethical practice of law should be understood
as an engagement with ethical and policy issues using a distinctive style of
reasoning different from the technical rationality of a discipline such as
engineering but also different from reasoning directly about ethics, as one
might learn in a class on moral philosophy. One of the most important as-
pects of the craft that law students learn is how to interpret the law when
representing and advising clients, and doing a professionally responsible
job at this task requires students, and ultimately lawyers, to grasp the law
from a particular interpretive standpoint.2' The Carnegie Report gets this
just right, I believe, when it distinguishes not between positive law and
morality but between engagement with practice and "detached objectiv-
ity."22 Legal education needs to shake off its preoccupation with external,
objective analysis and critique of legal doctrines, treating them as some-
thing worth studying from an external point of view, and spend more time
preparing students to be practitioners, viewing the professional practice
from the inside out, as it were. The Carnegie Report does not use the termi-
nology of external and internal points of view, which was made prominent
by H.L.A. Hart, 23 but it argues for taking as central to professional forma-
19. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THn ORIGIN OF THE BiLACK ACT 266 (1975).
20. See David Luban, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, 18 Soc.
PHn.. & Poi 'y 176, 176-205 (2001) reprinted in DAVID LuBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY 99 (2007).
21. I have made this argument at length elsewhere. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Profes-
sionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rv. 1167, 1168-69 (2005).
22. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
23. See H.L.A. HARI, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994). See also RAz, supra note 17,
at 154 (differentiating external statements about law, which are "statements about people's prac-
tices and actions, attitudes and beliefs concerning the law," from internal statements which are
used "as a standard by which to evaluate, guide, or criticize behaviour"). An external statement
may have normative content without expressing the speaker's own commitment to the standards it
reflects. So-called detached normative statements share the cognitive aspect of internal statements,
and appreciate their volitional dimension, but do not reveal the speaker as endorsing the volitional
dimension, that is, preferring it as a standard for herself. An example of a detached normative
statement would be one made by Brad, a meat eater, to Sherry, a vegan: "You shouldn't eat that
500 [Vol. 9:2
SHOULD LAW SCHOOLS TEACH ... ?
tion the perspective of someone who sought not to understand a practice but
to perform it. Lawyers, as I have argued (following Hart), understand the
law as creating genuine obligations, not merely enabling predictions of
when officials will impose sanctions on their clients. The idea of being a
good lawyer is therefore built into the distinctive internal regulative stan-
dards that both constitute the craft of the practice of law and define the
standards of excellence that one aims for in realizing the ends of the craft.24
If there is some relationship between the standards regulating the prac-
tice of the craft of lawyering and more general moral standards, as I suggest
here, then comprehensive reform of the law school curriculum may not be
required in order to contribute to the socially responsible practice of law.
Law teachers simply have to continue teaching their students to be good
lawyers. Unfortunately, the Carnegie Report obscures this simple, powerful
message by considering a jumble of concepts that are often lumped together
under the general heading of legal ethics, professionalism, professional re-
sponsibility, or some cognate term. When we talk about educating ethical
lawyers and measuring the success of the education process, a number of
different ideas could be implicated, and it is important to keep our concep-
tual vocabulary straight. Section I of this paper will therefore consider what
accrediting agencies like the ABA and expert reviewers such as the report-
ers for the Carnegie Foundation might mean when they call upon law
schools to invest more effort and resources into the ethical professional de-
velopment of lawyers. If ethical lawyering required that lawyers be made
into virtuous human beings, for example, that would be a very different
challenge than training lawyers to perform a specific activity to a high stan-
dard of excellence.
Talking about a craft-i.e., the idea of a practice with its own internal
standards of excellence in the realization of the ends of that activity-and
the relationship of those craft standards to general morality can sound a bit
mysterious. Section II of this paper therefore works carefully through an
example of the craft of lawyering and legal advising in action to show that
it is possible for lawyers to differentiate between genuine legal entitlements
and spurious interpretations that distort or manipulate the law. The example
comes from the controversy over the advice given by lawyers for the U.S.
Department of Justice to the government officials, at Guantanamo Bay and
elsewhere, involved in questioning detainees suspected of having informa-
tion about future acts of terrorism. The lawyers were called upon to deter-
dish-it contains meat." Brad does not accept the norm "don't eat meat" as one guiding his own
conduct, and in fact enthusiastically accepts the norm "eat as much meat as possible," but appreci-
ates that the norm against eating meat is action-guiding for Sherry. See generally RAz, supra note
17, at 153-57 (describing a detached legal statement); Nvn MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 37-39
(1981) (providing Hart's external point of view).
24. See generally AiLASDAIR MACINTYRE, ArrnR VIRTUE, (2d ed. 1984) (critiquing contempo-
rary moral philosophy).
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mine whether aggressive interrogation techniques amounted to legally
prohibited torture and concluded that they did not. Many observers (myself
included) believed the legal advice given was flawed as legal advice, quite
apart from the immorality of torture.25 Thus, the lawyers could be criticized
in ethical terms, as lawyers, for failing to observe the standards that define
the appropriate pursuit of the craft of lawyering. The example of advising
on torture is helpful for several reasons. For one, the reasoning of lawyers
advising the government was spelled out in detail, so there are actual legal
arguments available to analyze.26 Second, the torture debate throws into
sharp relief the analytic distinction between law and morality. When ob-
servers of legal education, such as the researchers of the Carnegie Report,
call for law schools to do more to educate lawyers for professional develop-
ment, one can use a case like the torture memos to ask what, exactly, is the
observed deficiency in ethics or professionalism. Is it the willingness to
assist government officials in the implementation of a policy that involves
grave violations of human rights? Or is it the willingness to distort the law
to produce a spurious legal permission to do something that is, in fact,
unlawful?
One may ask whether the distinction between law and morality is as
sharp as the traditional idea that the rule of law holds. Returning to the
torture controversy, some supporters of the Bush administration have ar-
gued that critics of the government's lawyers are "politicizing" the process
of legal advising and smuggling in contestable human rights norms under
25. See, e.g., HAROLD H. BRurT, BAD ATvIcE: BusH's LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
(2009); JACK Goi DSMITH, THE TERROR PREsIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH AT-
MINISIRAION (2007); David Luban, The Torture Lavyers of Washington, in DAVID LUBAN, LE-
GAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162 (2007). For an overview of the history of the torture
controversy and a review of five books about it, see W. Bradley Wendel, The Torture Memos and
the Demands of Legality, 12 LEGAL ETHICS 107 (2009).
26. The initial set of government memos, leaked during the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scan-
dal, was published along with other documents in the public record. See THE TORTURE PAPERS:
THE RoAD ro ABL GH-IRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). In 2009 the U.S.
Department of Justice released four previously classified memos, which shed additional light on
the reasoning used by the lawyers in an attempt to justify torture. These memos, which the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union sued to obtain their disclosure, are available at http://www.aclu.org-/
accountability/olc.html.
After the killing of an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, by a drone strike in Yemen, it was
reported that OLC lawyers had prepared a memo authorizing the target assassination of U.S.
citizens abroad, without trial, and notwithstanding an executive order banning assassinations, as
long as the President certified that the target posed a significant threat to American citizens and
could not be captured alive. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a
Citizen, N.Y. Timns, Oct. 8, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/
middleeast/secret-us-memo- made- legal -case-to-kill -a-citizen.html?scp=1&sq=Secret%20U.S.%20
Memo%20Made%2OLegal%2OCase%20to%2OKill%20a%20Citizen&st=cse. The memo remains
classified, but its contents were described by people familiar with it, on the condition of anonym-
ity. It should go without saying that if the memo is disclosed, it should be analyzed in the same
way as the torture memos discussed in this paper-i.e., for whether its legal reasoning is sound-
without regard for whether it was prepared by the OLC under President Obama instead of Presi-
dent Bush.
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the guise of legal interpretation.2 7 Similar criticisms have been made of
purportedly neutral legal arguments such as challenges to capital punish-
ment or support for reproductive rights. This poses a challenge to one con-
ception of the law as an apolitical discourse. Thus, one unappreciated aspect
of the debate over ethics education is whether it carries with it an implicit
ideological agenda and is therefore open to attack by critics from the right
or the left as merely politics by other means.
Throughout this paper I will argue that the law is not neutral in the
sense of having nothing to do with moral values. Even something as mun-
dane as the duty of reasonable care in torts or the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in commercial law embodies principles for how we should
relate to one another. These principles may overlap extensionally with ordi-
nary ethical norms, and in this way the law and ethics may align. Neverthe-
less, it is a central commitment of legal positivism that, in principle, the
content of legal norms may be determined without resort to moral argumen-
tation. 28 That is, it is possible to determine what legal duty one owes to
another without determining whether this is the legal duty one ought to
owe. Ethics and law are, in this way, analytically separable even if not sepa-
rate, and it is necessary for critics to take this separability into account
when urging reforms of legal ethics education.29
27. I participated in an extremely frustrating debate at the annual meeting of the Federalist
Society with Miguel Estrada, the lawyer representing former OLC lawyer John Yoo. Estrada ac-
cused Yoo's critics of using legal procedures, including an investigation by the Justice Depart-
ment's Office of Professional Responsibility and a Bivens action filed by a victim of torture,
essentially as a means of settling political scores. Yoo himself has accused lawyers and judges of
essentially being tools of terrorists, who use constitutional and other legal rights as part of a
strategy of "lawfare" to weaken the United States. See John Yoo, Terror Suspects are Waging
"Lawfare" on U.S., PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 16, 2008, at A15.
28. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL SID. 139
(1982), reprinted in DAvID LLBAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND 1HE LAW 3, 4-5, 16 (1988); Kent
Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism, in THE AuI ON
oMY or LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 1, 16-19 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). Moral princi-
ples may be incorporated into law, provided that there is a conventional practice among legal
officials of referring to them as reasons in support of a legal judgment. See, e.g., W.J.
WALUCHOW, INCLUSVE LEGAL PosrTIvIsM (1994); Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Convention-
ality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, 4 LEG. THEORY 381 (1998); E. Philip Soper, Legal
Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MicH. L. Rv. 473 (1977).
29. Methodologically, this paper is a contribution to the philosophy of legal education and
legal practice. Unlike some recent scholarship following the Carnegie Report, it does not make
empirical claims about why people comply with ethical norms (or fail to do so), nor does it rely on
the findings of social psychologists or learning theorists to suggest ways to improve legal educa-
tion. See, e.g., Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of Profes-
sionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GLo. J. LEGAL EIHICS 137 (2011); Neil
Hamilton & Verna Monson, Answering the Skeptics on Fostering Ethical Professional Formation
(Professionalism), 20 PROF. LAW. 3 (2011). The aim of this paper is, instead, to clarify the rela-
tionship between law and morality in law in legal practice, and therefore in legal education.
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I. DEFINING OUR TERMS
A. Legal Norms Governing the Conduct of Lawyers
Lawyers are regulated by rules of professional conduct, generally
based on the ABA's Model Rules,3 0 adopted and enforced by state courts,
and subjecting lawyers to professional discipline, as well as by aspects of
the general law of agency, torts, contracts, evidence, procedure, etc., which
create legal obligations to clients, tribunals, and third parties. Taken to-
gether, these regulatory norms constitute the law governing lawyers. The
law governing lawyers is significantly broader than state rules patterned on
the ABA Model Rules. The Carnegie Report makes a common but signifi-
cant mistake when it talks about casebooks structured around "cases that
concern alleged violations of the Model Rules."31 In fact, however, sophis-
ticated professional responsibility casebooks are mostly structured around
cases in which lawyers are sued by clients or non-clients for breaches of
duty imposed by tort, agency, and contract law; assert privileges arising
under evidence and procedural law; are accused by clients of ineffective
assistance of counsel; or are litigating disqualification motions-most con-
flicts of interest cases are not really about violations of the Model Rules
(i.e., state disciplinary rules) but about remedies crafted by courts under
their inherent power to protect the integrity of the litigation process. There
are a few cases arising out of disciplinary proceedings in most casebooks,
but, with very few exceptions, the canon of central cases in the subject is
not comprised of disciplinary cases. 2
30. MoDEL RuErs or PRor'E CONDUCT (2011) [hereinafter MODrE RuErs R. xx]. The Model
Rules are reprinted in numerous rules supplements for classroom use. They were extensively
amended in 2002 and 2003 after extensive study by the Ethics 2000 Commission and less exten-
sively at intervals thereafter. The ABA's Commission on Ethics 20/20 is considering amendments
to the rules to reflect some of the challenges posed for lawyers by technology and the globaliza-
tion of legal practice, but unlike the Ethics 2000 Commission's product, the changes proposed by
the Ethics 20/20 Commission will not be comprehensive.
31. CARNEGIE REPOR1, supra note 3, at 148.
32. It would take a great deal of space to defend the definition of a canonical case and argue
for cases that should be included, but for the time being I will propose a short list of cases that all
teachers in the area know and can discuss in detail: Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1980); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996) (a
disciplinary case); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); Grey-
cas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987);
Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); Birbrower, Montalbano,
Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty., 17 Cal. 4th 119 (Cal. 1998); Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (originally a disciplinary action, but one that turned
into a constitutional challenge to the rule); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978) (physi-
cal-evidence case); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967); Commonwealth v. Stenhach,
534 A.2d 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682 (Cal. 1981); In re O.P.M.
Leasing Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1985), the litigation arising out of the savings-and-loan
crisis, and the recent developments in Enron, Refco, etc. I would be happy to entertain suggestions
for additions or deletions to the canon, but the point is, any list that a teacher in the area would
504 [Vol. 9:2
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Lawyers have an unfortunate habit of referring to this body of law as
"legal ethics," but it is really no more or less about ethics than, say, torts or
contracts.33 On one view, contract law fundamentally concerns the legal
enforceability of promises; alternatively, contract law may be seen as a
practice that facilitates economically efficient transactions.34 In either case,
the law tracks ordinary moral considerations to some extent, although legal
principles may not always perfectly overlap with substantive morality be-
cause of institutional and procedural considerations. Nevertheless, no one
refers to contract law as "transactional ethics." The law governing lawyers
is pervaded by principles that have analogues in ordinary morality. For ex-
ample, lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients, which means they must exer-
cise the highest degree of care and loyalty in the representation of clients,
refrain from self-dealing, keep client secrets and not use confidential infor-
mation to the disadvantage of clients, and not take advantage of their supe-
rior knowledge and expertise in business dealings with clients. 5 These
legal principles overlap with moral ideals of trust, loyalty, faithfulness, and
caretaking. Indeed, a life spent being a faithful agent, a loyal friend, a
steadfast supporter, or a champion is enormously appealing as a vocation.36
come up with is likely to be overwhelmingly weighted against disciplinary cases, and it is embar-
rassing that the Carnegie Report does not appreciate this very basic point.
33. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. Rny.
963, 963 (1987) ("Most of what American lawyers and law teachers call legal ethics is not ethics.
Most of what is called legal ethics is similar to rules made by administrative agencies.").
34. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV.
L. REv. 708 (2007).
35. See, e.g., MODu, RuIFs R. 1.1 (competence); MODEL RuLEs R. 1.2(a) (fidelity to client
objectives); MODEL, RuLEs R. 1.3 (diligence); MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a) (confidentiality); MODEL
RULES R. 1.8(a) (heightened scrutiny of business transactions with clients); MODEL RULES R.
1.8(b) (no adverse use of confidential information); see generally GEOYFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET
AL., THE LAW AND ETHics oY LAWYFRING 770-858 (5th ed. 2010) (reprinting and summarizing
numerous cases and rules establishing stringent fiduciary duties owed by lawyers to clients).
36. Daniel Markovits argues that although the role of lawyer is justified impartially (that is,
on agent-neutral reasons), it fails on subjective, personal, or agent-relative terms. It may be mor-
ally permissible to serve as a representative of clients-i.e., the adversary system excuse is a
sound argument-but this is not a suitable object of one's own commitment. See DANIEL MARKO-
VITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 103-17 (2008).
He therefore offers a reconstruction of the lawyer's role in terms of the value of what he calls
fidelity, which is very different from what I mean by fidelity to law. Fidelity, for Markovits, is
fidelity to the client's story, but it is also a peculiar kind of agency relationship, in which the
lawyer-agent exercises no judgment of her own. Id. at 164-69. It is therefore not the conception of
fidelity in representation that is embodied in the existing law of lawyering, which emphasizes in
many places the right and indeed the obligation of the lawyer to exercise independent professional
judgment. See, e.g., MODEL RULEs R. 1.2(a) (recognizing authority of lawyer to determine the
means by which the client's objectives will be pursued); MODEL RuEs R. 1.16(b)(4) (permitting
lawyer to withdraw from representation when client and lawyer have "a fundamental disagree-
ment"); MODEL RULLS R. 2.1 (requiring lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment
and permitting lawyer to counsel client based on "moral, economic, social and political factors").
While Markovits rightly focuses on the importance of being able to endorse one's actions from the
point of view of one's personal commitments and ground projects, the ideal he offers as a suitable
object of that commitment is foreign to the existing law of lawyering (which Markovits might
concede) and, in my view, either devoid of ethical content or covertly appealing to the very notion
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Lawyers, prospective lawyers, and non-lawyers alike are drawn to arche-
types in literature like Atticus Finch who embody these virtues.
A lawyer need not necessarily embody ordinary moral virtues, how-
ever. As Bernard Williams observed in a classic essay: "Among political
acts are some for which there are good political reasons, as that important
and worthy political projects would fail without these acts, but which are
acts that honourable and scrupulous people might, prima facie at least, be
disinclined to do."" There are "good political reasons," in Williams's
terms, for many of the things that lawyers do, but decent, humane people
might nevertheless feel a bit disinclined to do them. There is a vivid story in
the last chapter of Seymour Wishman's Confessions of a Criminal Lawyer
of having been the accused at a trial lacking even the rudiments of due
process, at a youth camp in the Soviet Union. As a result he understandably
came to appreciate the significance of procedural (or, one might say politi-
cal) values of the right to notice of the charges brought, a general statement
of the elements of a crime of which one is accused, the right to confront
witnesses, some transparency of procedures, determination of guilt by an
impartial decision-maker, and so on.
Wishman brilliantly juxtaposes this story with the moral costs he ex-
perienced as a result of a career as a criminal defense lawyer, including
pervasive cynicism, distrustfulness of people, arrogance, "cold detach-
ment"-i.e., a distance from normal emotional responses to violence and
suffering-and a capacity to engage in contrived and even deceitful per-
formance of emotions on cue." Wishman does not question the justification
of his actions as a lawyer. As Williams would say, there are good political
of professional judgment that he claims to reject. Markovits argues that lawyerly negative capabil-
ity "enables [lawyers] to state claims for clients who would otherwise be inarticulate and their
procedural skills enable them to forge and sustain compromises that escape more judgmental
ordinary people." MARKOVITS, supra, at 166. The vision here is of lawyers either being nothing
more than translators-articulate "mouthpieces" who enable clients to express themselves in lan-
guage the legal system will acknowledge-or skilled mediators who bring the parties together in a
transformative engagement, mediated by the legal process, which enables the parties to transcend
their selfish (or at least particular) interests and understand them as instances of broader principles
that can be endorsed by other citizens. See id. at 188-90. It seems to me, at least, that the pur-
ported ideal of being an empty vessel into which one's client's interests are poured is the worst
caricature of the lawyer's role, as being merely a tool of one's client, and worthless as an object of
ethical commitment. The ideal of transformative engagement is potentially quite appealing (al-
though I think it romanticizes the political process beyond recognition), but in order for prefer-
ences to be transformed, the parties' lawyers would almost certainly have to prod, cajole, and
maybe even manipulate their clients into agreeing with a position that stands in place of the ex
ante interests the parties had before engaging lawyers to help them resolve their disagreement.
37. See Tim DARE, THE COUNSEL oF ROGUES? A DEFENSE OF IHE SIANDARD CONCEPION
OF IHE LAWYER'S ROLE 106-22 (2009) (considering how Atticus Finch, the hero of Harper Lee's
novel To Kill a Mockingbird, has become a professional ideal).
38. Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY
(1978), reprinted in BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-80, 54, 57
(1981).
39. See SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 225-29, 238-40(1981).
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reasons for what he did, reasons that Wishman himself could appreciate as a
result of his experience at the Soviet youth camp, but there were also long-
term, corrosive effects on Wishman's moral character. Legal justification
and ordinary moral virtue do not always line up as neatly as in the character
of Atticus Finch.
This point matters for several reasons. First, I think there is no more
dangerous advice for graduates entering law practice than "consult your
moral compass." Professional responsibility casebooks are littered with ex-
amples of lawyers who tried to do the right thing, in ordinary moral terms,
but nevertheless failed to comply with the standards of the law governing
lawyers. For example, one casebook has a principal case and a note case on
business transactions with clients.40 In neither case did the lawyer overreach
and take advantage of the fiduciary relationship with the client. The client
was no worse off, and may have been better off, because of the lawyer's
role in the transaction. In "moral compass" terms, the lawyers behaved as
loyal agents. In law of lawyering terms, however, the lawyers failed to ob-
tain the informed consent of their clients after adequate disclosure. Those
lawyers needed to hear the message that they should carefully consult the
applicable law on business transactions with clients, and, beyond treating
the client with substantive fairness, they should provide adequate disclo-
sure, recommend that the client seek the advice of independent counsel, and
obtain the client's informed consent in writing.41
In addition, the Carnegie Report is potentially misleading in two re-
spects concerning the subject of the law of lawyering and its relationship
with general ethical norms. One is that the Model Rules and disciplinary
cases represent the profession's ethical values.4 2 As Susan Koniak has ar-
gued in an influential paper, however, the law of lawyering is the locus of
conflict between the profession and society, with the latter represented by
courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies, as against the bar's self-
serving rules, which do more to protect lawyers than clients, other institu-
tions in the legal system assert the rights of non-lawyers and, to some ex-
tent, non-clients.4 3 The second is that the principles of the law of lawyering
are morally neutral. The authors of the Report cannot mean this because at
the same time they criticize law school professional responsibility courses
for not giving sufficient attention to the question of whether the duties of
lawyers conflict with other obligations, such as the obligation to tell the
truth or protect others from harm. There could only be a conflict if the law
40. See HAZARD FT AL., supra note 35, at 813-16 (reprinting Comm'r on Prof'1 Ethics &
Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1982), and discussing
Passante v. McWilliam, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
41. See MODnL RUirs R. 1.8(a).
42. See CARNEGm REPORT, supra note 3, at 148.
43. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rrv. 1389,
1395-1402 (1992).
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took a position, such as the requirement that lawyers keep client confi-
dences notwithstanding the harm to others. This duty may be a good or a
bad thing, but it is certainly not morally neutral.
B. Extralegal Moral Norms Governing the Conduct of Lawyers
The Carnegie Report asks a version of one of the central questions in
critical (or theoretical or philosophical) legal ethics: "Does the responsibil-
ity to pursue substantive justice in individual cases and to consider the
broader impact of one's actions conflict with advocacy on behalf of one's
client?"44 To put the question somewhat differently, are professional roles
morally differentiated from ordinary morality? Philosophically-minded le-
gal ethics scholars insist that there must be an irreducible element of moral
agency in professional ethics.4 5 No matter what, a person must give due
consideration to values such as honesty, fairness, human dignity, and truth,
and therefore, it may be the case that professional ethics is simply an appli-
cation of these everyday moral values to dilemmas that arise in the course
of one's practice. As any law student soon realizes, however, the role of
lawyer sometimes seems to require lawyers to act contrary to these ordinary
values. This is known as the problem of role-differentiated morality.4 6 For
example, as long as she does not introduce false evidence, a criminal de-
fense lawyer may argue for the acquittal of a client whom the lawyer knows
is guilty of the offense charged. Most lawyers would have little trouble
coming up with reasons why it is not really unethical, even in ordinary
moral terms, to argue for the acquittal of a guilty client. Familiar considera-
tions such as safeguarding the dignity and autonomy of persons who en-
counter the criminal justice system, checking the power of the state by
requiring the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and
preventing lawyers from prejudging their clients' cases and providing less
zealous advocacy all tell in favor of a moral as well as a legal obligation to
defend the guilty. In other cases, however, the moral case for the role-spe-
cific obligations of lawyers is more difficult to make, and some scholars
44. CARNEGIm REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 1. Elsewhere the Report suggests that law students
might benefit from "more connections with the arts and sciences in the larger academic context."
Id. at 32. I certainly have no objection to law students learning more about history, philosophy,
political science, or economics, and it seems reasonable to believe that moral reflection might be
enhanced by a broad liberal arts education. Nevertheless, at least one object of moral reflection for
law students must be justice and morality as pursued through the law. Therefore the question of
the relationship between law and morality cannot be avoided.
45. See, e.g., David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93
CORNVTT L. REv. 1437, 1438-42 (2008).
46. I believe this term was introduced into professional ethics by Alan Goldman, but it has
since become a standard way of framing an important question in legal ethics. See generally AiLAN
H. GoiDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980).
508 [Vol. 9:2
SHOULD LAW SCHOOLS TEACH ... ?
fault the so-called standard conception of legal ethics for subordinating sub-
stantive justice or the rights of non-clients to the interests of clients.47
Apparently some law school faculty members worry about teaching
the role of extralegal moral principles because they perceive it as "indoctri-
nation" or "hav[ing] an agenda."48 I have never understood this objection to
taking a critical, external perspective on the values underlying some area of
law or practice. One professor quoted in the Carnegie Report says, "I con-
sider [students] to be adults and would prefer them to bring their own val-
ues to law school than to try to inculcate them with my values."4 9 But
surely the point of critical scrutiny of the legal profession's values is not, at
least primarily, to compel students to endorse a particular evaluative posi-
tion. Rather, it is to examine carefully the arguments given in support of a
conception of professional ethics that permits or requires departures from
standards of ordinary morality. Take a simple case, a chestnut in legal eth-
ics scholarship, in which a debtor directs a lawyer to assert the statute of
limitations as a defense to an action for breach of contract where the debtor
admits that he in fact promised to repay the loan.o It does not require in-
doctrination or imposing one's values on students to reach the point of rec-
ognizing a moral obligation to repay an acknowledged debt. The interesting
moral question is, instead, whether there are good moral reasons to permit
lawyers to assert procedural defenses to defeat claims based on substantive
entitlements. Most legal ethics scholars believe there is-it is hard to find
anyone who would criticize the lawyer in the statute of limitations case in
moral terms for asserting the statute of limitations.
But regardless of how one comes out on this case, it is no more a
process of "indoctrination" to critique the argument for permission to assert
the statute of limitations than it would be to ask a similar question about,
say, the absence of a duty to rescue in torts. Virtually any interesting law
school class-i.e., one that aspires to be more than simply preparation for
47. See, e.g., WITLIAM H. SIMON, Tnv PRACTICE OF JusTicE: A TrnORY or LAWYERs' ETH-
Ics 16-18 (1998).
48. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 135-36; see also id. at 148 ("many law teachers are
concerned about imposing their moral beliefs on students").
49. Id. at 136.
50. See Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452, 453 (7th Cir. 1957).
51. An exception might be William Simon, who is quoted in the Carnegie Report as urging
lawyers to take actions that seem most likely to promote justice. See CARNEGiE REPORT, Supra
note 3, at 131 (quoting SIMON, supra note 47, at 9). Simon asserts that a lawyer should decide
whether or not to plead the statute of limitations based on the lawyer's assessment of what end the
statute is intended to serve and whether that end would be vindicated by pleading it in this particu-
lar case. For example, if the purpose of the statute, in the lawyer's judgment, is to prevent the
introduction of stale, unreliable evidence, and there is no danger of unreliable evidence being
introduced in this case (because it is all documentary or because all the parties agree on the
relevant facts), then the lawyer is not justified in asserting the statute as a defense. See SIMON,
supra note 47, at 33. I say Simon "might" be an exception because he argues that ethical decision
making is contextual, so there may be a case like Zabella, tweaked in relevant ways, in which the
lawyer would be permitted to assert the statute of limitations.
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the bar exam-takes a critical look at the moral, social, and economic poli-
cies that underlie legal doctrines. I have not heard anyone seriously contend
that it is illegitimate to question something like Calabresi's argument that
negligence rules should minimize the sum of accident and prevention costs.
That is an extralegal policy argument but one that is rightly considered part
of the subject of torts, as it should be taught in law schools. The same is
true of critical scrutiny of claims about legal ethics, such as the commonly
held view that there is nothing wrong with asserting a procedural defense to
defeat a substantively valid claim.
In addition to considering moral values as "policy" arguments within
the general purview of law, many law school professional responsibility
courses go further and acknowledge a critical perspective outside the law,
based in general morality. Many books include classic cases such as
Spaulding v. Zimmerman52 or the Lake Pleasant hidden bodies case,
which allow teachers to ask whether a lawyer is morally justified in com-
plying with the law requiring, in both cases, keeping client confidences
when disclosure would alleviate the suffering of others. Again, this is not
indoctrination but the scrutiny of arguments to see whether they hold up,
whether they have troublesome implications, or whether there is an incon-
sistency in the position asserted.
Regarding confidentiality, critics have noted that the profession's com-
mitment to confidentiality is not absolute and that lawyers are quite willing
to disclose client confidences in self-defense or in order to collect a fee;54
that the organized bar has asserted a duty of confidentiality that is much
stronger than that recognized in general agency law;55 that confidentiality
duties are essentially self-serving and not in the interests of clients;" that
confidentiality is not required to enable lawyers to counsel clients to com-
ply with the law;" and that no duty is absolute, and in some cases must
52. Spaulding v. Zimmermam, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
53. For a summary of the case see RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL
COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUITH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 7-26 (1999). The
defense lawyers in the case were prosecuted (ultimately unsuccessfully) for violating a statute
respecting the treatment of bodies, see People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798
(Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60,
359 N.E.2d 371, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
54. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 110- 11 (2000); see MODEL
RULES R. 1.6(b)(5); MODEL RULES R. 1.6 cmt. 11 (modern rule recognizing the exception);
MODEL CODE OF PROr'L RESPONSIBILIlY DR 4-101(C)(4) (2010) (more clearly identifying fee
collection as a ground for disclosing confidential information). The relegation to the comments by
the ABA of the permission to disclose to collect a fee suggests that the organized bar was embar-
rassed at the explicit recognition of the financial interests of lawyers as a reason to disclose confi-
dential client information.
55. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL., supra note 35, at 331-32; Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confi-
dentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351, 361-62 (1989).
56. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998).
57. SIMON, supra note 47, at 55-57; Zacharias, supra note 55, at 369-70.
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yield to other obligations, such as saving the life of another." The Carnegie
Report notes that non-specialists in the law of lawyering believe themselves
to be unqualified to introduce ethical issues (in the legal sense) in their
classes.
It might have also observed that even specialists in the law of lawyer-
ing might feel uncomfortable tackling issues of critical morality from a non-
legal perspective. A teacher might be concerned that class discussion of
Spaulding might turn into a technical exercise in moral philosophy. One
plausible account of Spaulding is that it involves a conflict of duties, be-
tween a duty to warn the young plaintiff of his potentially life-threatening
injury and the duty of confidentiality imposed by law to keep the informa-
tion secret. Even this simple perspective on the case discloses potentially
complex issues, such as the distinction between actively harming someone
and merely taking no action to prevent their harm60 and the metaethical
issue of whether it is coherent at all to talk about duties being in conflict.'
An instructor may not be prepared to deal with the ramifications of class
discussion of this case in terms of moral philosophy, may believe that it is
better not to treat an issue at all if any treatment were bound to be superfi-
cial, or may simply not have sufficient time in the semester to devote to
theoretical issues that, in the end, do not explain the result of the Spaulding
decision itself (which actually went off on the necessity of obtaining court
approval for a settlement of a minor's claim) or enable a lawyer to under-
stand the principles underlying the legal duty of confidentiality.
58. RHODE, supra note 54, at 110 (arguing that concerns about the rights of clients do not
"explain why the rights of clients should always take precedence over the rights of everyone else,
particularly where health and safety are at stake").
59. See CARNEGIiE REPORT, supra note 3, at 149. The Report goes on to recommend more
ethics teaching by the pervasive method, meaning an integration of professional responsibility
issues into other courses. Id. at 151-52. Credit for popularizing and advocating for pervasive-
method teaching belongs primarily to Deborah Rhode, and her casebook for pervasive teaching is
very good. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIIY: ETHICS BY IHE PERVASIVE
METHOD (2d ed. 1998). The problem with the pervasive method is that the law of lawyering really
is its own legal subject and one which non-specialists do not always get right. (My anecdotal
support for this proposition comes from the questions I field from my colleagues who are attempt-
ing to integrate ethics issues into their classes.) The Carnegie Report cites a pervasive-method
civil procedure course incorporating a significant component of professional responsibility, but
significantly the teacher, Charles Silver, is a bona fide professional responsibility scholar in addi-
tion to his other areas of expertise. CARNEGmE REPORT, Supra note 3, at 152.
60. This is the theme of several classic examples in moral philosophy, including the Trolley
Problem and Jim and the Indians. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of
Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES 19, 23 (1978) (trolley problem); Bernard Williams, A Cri-
tique of Utilitarianism, in UTILro1AInMism: FoR AND AGAINSI 77, 98-99 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard
Williams eds., 1973) (problem where a traveler must kill one of twenty captives or all captives
will be killed).
61. See, e.g., BARBARA HERMAN, THEw PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 79-83 (1993);
Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QiESTIONS 128 (1979); W.D. Ross, THE
RIGHT AND THE GOOD 41-42 (1930).
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A different way to take a critical evaluative perspective, without indoc-
trination and without having to grapple with specialized issues in moral
philosophy, would be to consider claims about the immanent normative
structure of professional ethics.6 2 Immanence claims in law hold that a par-
ticular area of legal doctrine is structured around certain values, ideals, or
ends, and the rules and principles that make up that area of law can be seen
as instantiations or particular applications of those principles. These argu-
ments bridge the is/ought gap by beginning with an observation about the
content of legal norms, then asking what social value or purpose the norms
can be seen as serving. Legal interpretation and adjudication can then make
use of these immanent values to justify a conclusion about the content of
the law. A familiar immanence claim in torts is Posner's argument that the
negligence standard embodies an ideal of economic efficiency.6 3 One could
perform a similar analysis on the law governing lawyers, seeking to estab-
lish that the existing framework of law can best be understood as embody-
ing certain values or ends.
This is, in part, the argumentative strategy of Daniel Markovits's re-
cent book.64 On one reading of the book, Markovits can be understood as
making a two-part immanence argument. First, he contends that the law
governing lawyers, considered in terms of "broad and organic ethics
rules"" and the "genetic structure""6 of the relevant law, requires lawyers
to engage in the vices of lying and cheating. (These are terms of art for
Markovits: He defines lying as promoting beliefs in others that one reasona-
bly believes to be false and cheating as exploiting an advantage to which
one is not entitled.)67 This is a classic immanence argument, because Mar-
kovits dismisses explicit legal limitations on lying and cheating (such as the
duty of candor in Rule 3.3) as "self-consciously and insistently technical""
and insufficient to counteract the general tendency in the law toward com-
manding lying and cheating. He follows this up with a second, critical im-
manence argument, which is that in contrast to the vices demanded by the
currently dominant understanding of the sense and purpose underlying the
law of lawyering, the ethical obligations of lawyers should be reoriented
around a kind of suppressed or forgotten ethical ideal, which is nonetheless
already immanent within the law. This ideal is that of negative capability.
Lawyers should serve as mouthpieces (in a good sense) for clients, allowing
them to participate in the process of democratic self-government at a "re-
62. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Fonnalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law,
97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
63. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL SLrD. 29 (1972).
64. MARKOVIIS, supra note 37.
65. Id. at 42.
66. Id. at 44.
67. Id. at 36-41.
68. Id. at 47.
512 [Vol. 9:2
SHOULD LAW SCHOOLS TEACH ... ?
tail" level and thereby enhance the legitimacy of the law."9 Markovits does
not explicitly frame this as an immanence argument, but he does identify it
as an "alternative tradition""0 and a redescription of existing practices."
I find Markovits's first claim to be utterly astonishing and unrecogniz-
able as an interpretation of the law governing lawyers. Other scholars,
whose immanence claims I find much more persuasive, conclude that the
law of lawyering imposes significant, structural, "organic," "genetic," or
what have you limitations on lying and cheating.7 2 But the trouble with
immanence arguments is that one must be immersed in the field to evaluate
them. Any given case can be dismissed as a "technical limitation" and not
part of the law's "genetic structure." Overall sense and rationality emerges
only from consideration of dozens of leading cases, knowledge of the his-
tory of the development of legal doctrines, and engagement with current
developments in the law. Yet it is difficult to, say, "read a bunch of cases"
as a response to an argument that the underlying rationality and purpose of
the law is some end-gatekeeping, lying and cheating, zealous advocacy of
client interests, moral counseling, or whatever. More to the point of this
paper, making an immanence claim is essentially a matter of doing, just in
the same way that ethical practice is a matter of doing. I find Markovits's
argument unpersuasive because it does not describe the same craft I en-
gaged in as a lawyer and continue to engage in (albeit somewhat more pe-
ripherally) as a teacher of future lawyers. Critically evaluating ethical
arguments in a professional domain requires engagement in a practice, not
merely detached observation. In this way, both practice and its regulative
standards are a matter of knowing-how, not knowing-that.
C. The Morality of Law
A common theme in the critique of American legal education has been
that law schools socialize students to understand social problems in purely
legal terms, abstracted from moral considerations such as honesty, fairness,
or justice. Karl Llewellyn thought it was a good thing that professors in
first-year courses aim "to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia ...
along with woozy thinking,"" but it is important to consider the point he
was trying to make, which is that terms like "reasonable" and "good faith"
are terms of art in the law and may not have the same meaning in legal
discourse as they do in ordinary ethics. Nevertheless, law students and ob-
69. Id. at 196-201.
70. Id. at 155.
71. Id. at 161-63; see also id. at 165 (arguing that this alternative ideal "is no makeshift
construction, cobbled together out of sealing wax and string to put a brave face on a fundamen-
tally dismal form of life").
72. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the
SEC, 103 COLum. L. REv. 1236 (2003); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They
Still Don't Get It, 6 GE,.O. J. LEGAL ETIcs 701 (1993).
73. KARL N. LIEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUsH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STvDY 116 (1930).
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servers of legal education worry that the analytic separability between legal
and moral reasoning (which is all that is meant by legal positivism) can too
easily become a hermetic separation. The Carnegie Report quotes law stu-
dents describing the tacit messages they received from their first-year
courses about the relationship between law and morality:
When I took criminal law, I started to think of it in technical
terms and stopped looking at the human side.
Most teachers don't bring in ethical issues. You are supposed to
divorce yourself from those concerns.7 4
Roger Cramton's classic essay on the implicit value system of legal
education similarly faults law teachers for encouraging students to take a
purely instrumental attitude toward legal reasoning that uses the law merely
as a means through which the client can achieve his or her goals." Students
accordingly adopt a crude relativism with respect to ethics"6 and an attitude
toward legal determinacy, certainty, neutrality, and stability that could be a
caricature of Critical Legal Studies." As a result, they tend to resent any
explicit discussion of values as "preaching" or "indoctrination."7
The Carnegie Report recommends integration of substantive moral
considerations into law school courses. It describes an introductory section
from the Fuller and Eisenberg contracts casebook, on the consideration doc-
trine, in which an excerpt from the classic case of Dougherty v. Salt 9 is
followed by a note on the moral obligation to keep one's promises.so The
Report faults instructors for telling students "that their concerns about fair-
ness or other moral concerns are not relevant to legal analysis" and notes
that "many students find it bewildering rather than clarifying" to be told
that, for example, the aunt in the consideration case could break her prom-
ise without incurring legal liability because it was wholly gratuitous."' Here
I think the authors of the Report are the ones engaging in crude caricatures.
I am not a contracts teacher, but I assume any competent first-year profes-
sor would use a case like Doughtery to elucidate the functions of contract
law by probing into the reasons why some promises can be legally enforced
and others are left to informal social sanctions for enforcement. In the first-
year subject I do teach, torts, students look at questions about the relation-
ship between law and morality, such as the absence of a general duty to
rescue, as a way of understanding legal-process considerations, which
themselves have moral significance. Reasons commonly given for courts'
74. CARNEGIE REPORI, supra note 3, at 141.
75. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 247, 250 (1978).
76. Id. at 254.
77. Id. at 254-55.
78. Id. at 256.
79. 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919).
80. CARNEGmI REPORT, supra note 3, at 143-44.
81. Id. at 144.
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refusal to recognize a duty to rescue include (1) line-drawing problems with
respect to which of potentially numerous onlookers should be potentially
liable for failing to come to the plaintiffs assistance;8 2 (2) line-drawing
problems with respect to what affirmative acts will be required of would-be
rescuers;" (3) concern with not interfering with the moral autonomy of
potential rescuers;84 (4) a view that there is no causal connection between
non-rescue and the resulting harm;1 and (5) concern about the incentive
effects of a duty to rescue." These are all standard so-called policy argu-
ments, many of which refer to considerations of what might be called legal
morality, that is, the reasons why legal norms might have particular proper-
ties, such as generality, ex ante certainty, stability, and ease of application.
Their status as normative arguments does not exclude them from the first-
year classroom; in fact, any teacher who did not consider the reasons com-
monly given for not recognizing a duty to rescue in torts, or for maintaining
the consideration requirement in contracts, would be unusual in these
courses.
Considerations related to the value of the rule of law may justify de-
partures from what would otherwise be the standards of ordinary morality.
The aunt in Doughtery might be blameworthy in ordinary moral terms for
reneging on the promise to her nephew, but there may nevertheless be good
reasons for contract law to decline to enforce gratuitous promises. Defend-
ants in many failure to rescue cases may have behaved reprehensibly," but
the legal process and rule of law considerations suffice to justify a no duty
rule exonerating them from legal liability. This is not the exclusion of mo-
rality from the law school classroom, as the Carnegie Report fears, but the
consideration of the moral norms that regulate the institutional practice of
deciding cases according to principles laid down in advance with due regard
82. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTs § 12.3, at 317 (1999); W. PAGE KEEION ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 56, at 376 (5th ed. 1984); KFNNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS
AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAw 234-35 (3d ed. 2007).
83. Lord Macaulay's concern about the elasticity of the duty to rescue is classic:
It will hardly be maintained that a surgeon ought to be treated as a murderer for refusing
to go from Calcutta to Meerut to perform an operation, although it should be absolutely
certain that this surgeon was the only person in India who could perform it, and that if it
were not performed, the person who required it would die.
Quoted in Jeremy Waldron, On the Road: Good Samaritans and Compelling Duties, 40 SANIA
CLARA L. REv. 1053, 1069 (2000).
84. EPSTEIN, supra note 82, § 11.2, at 288 ("the object of the law is to maximize the sphere
of individual autonomy and choice, which it does by minimizing the level of coercive legal inter-
actions imposed upon unsuspecting bystanders.").
85. KFFTON FT AL., supra note 82, § 56, at 373 ("The reason for the distinction may be said
to lie in the fact that by 'misfeasance' the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff,
while by 'nonfeasance' he has at least made his situation no worse.').
86. ErsrIN, supra note 82, § 11.2, at 288 ("[D]efenders of the common law rule fear that
imposing a duty to rescue will, perversely, induce individuals to stay far removed from harm's
way lest they be saddled with onerous liabilities.").
87. See, e.g., Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass. 1928) (defendant rented a flimsy
canoe to two intoxicated individuals and then ignored their cries for help when the boat capsized).
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for the rights of the litigants and for the capacity of decision makers (judges
and juries, as appropriate) to apply the governing standards. The practice of
adjudication imposes constraints on the types of questions that can be de-
cided, under what standards, and by whom." As a conceptual matter, prac-
tices have their own internal normative standards, which are given by the
nature and end of the practice." A legal system, by its nature, is a practice
of governance that is different from other ways of making decisions and
directing the affairs of others.
The classic ideal of the rule of law is that "all persons and authorities
within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled
to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly
administered by the courts."90 The ideal of legality emphasizes constraint
on the arbitrary exercise of power.9' It therefore has a kind of "inner moral-
ity," to cite Lon Fuller's conception of law as a purposive activity of sub-
jecting human activities to the governance of rules.92 A norm can be legal
or can be nothing more than the exercise of arbitrary power. As a result, law
teachers and law students may care about how a decision is made as much
as they do about the substantive moral content of the decision.93 Some
kinds of decisions are not typically made well by the legal system; just how
heroic someone must be to save another from danger is one of those deci-
sions, which is one reason why tort law does not recognize a duty to rescue.
Complex "polycentric" engineering and design decisions, involving trade-
offs among numerous competing values such as safety, cost, utility, ease of
maintenance, aesthetic appeal, etc., are arguably also inherently not deci-
sions the legal system ought to be second-guessing. 94 Of course, one may
disagree with any of these arguments, for example, by offering an adminis-
trable standard that could be used to evaluate when a bystander should have
88. In this regard I have learned a great deal from my colleague Jim Henderson. See, e.g.,
James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNEI L. Rv. 901 (1982); James A.
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J.
467 (1976). Henderson in turn was influenced by Lon Fuller, in works such as The Form and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. Rrv. 353 (1978).
89. See MACINYRi, supra note 24.
90. Thomas Bingham (Baron of Cornhill), The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 69
(2007).
91. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THn AUTHORITY OF LAW 219
(1979).
92. LON L. FuiiR, THE, MORALITY OF LAW 106 (rev. ed. 1964). Fuller uses the term "inner
morality of law" on page 42, and elsewhere, and refers to the eight criteria that a law or a legal
system must satisfy in order for it to express the quality of legality and not be merely a means of
governing by fiat.
93. Compare the observation in the Carnegie Report that the case-dialogue method of in-
struction aims at students internalizing "a recognizably legal point of view," including a concep-
tion of facts as something like "facts that are relevant to the disposition of a case" as opposed to
"what really happened." CARNEGmF REPORT, supra note 3, at 52-53.
94. James A. Henderson, Jr., Should a "Process Defense" Be Recognized in Design Defect
Cases?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 585 (1981).
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come to the assistance of a person in peril" or by articulating a test for
product defect that takes into account the polycentric nature of design deci-
sions.96 But these are positions taken within the practice of legal reasoning,
referring to ordinary moral considerations, to be sure, but also respecting
the constraints of a practice of reason giving that emphasizes publicity,
prospectivity, and constraint on the arbitrary exercise of power.
As the discussion of the consideration rule and the absence of a duty to
rescue show, respect for legality does not guarantee that the law will reach
results that are identical with the outcome of moral deliberation in a rele-
vantly similar case. An ordinary person sitting on a dock with access to a
long pole would presumably have no difficulty in concluding that she is
morally required to use the pole to help rescue a drowning swimmer. The
rule of law may not even be instrumentally morally valuable, in the sense
that complying with the demands of the law will tend, over the long run, to
enable people to do better at complying with the demands of morality." An
instrument like a knife or the law may be used for good or bad ends, and
conformity with functional or instrumental criteria, such as sharpness for a
knife or Fuller's eight standards of legality for the law, does not bear any
necessary relationship with morality.9 8 If, on the other hand, respect for the
law is a way of respecting the inherent dignity and equality of one's fellow
citizens, even in the circumstances of deep disagreement about what moral-
ity requires, then there is something intrinsically good about the rule of
law." The ethics in lawyering can therefore be understood, not in terms of
underlying moral goods to be pursued through legal means, but in terms of
the non-instrumental value of legality as a virtue of societies characterized
by tolerance and respect for all citizens.
An interesting version of the rule-of-law argument appears in the Car-
negie Report's discussion of professional responsibility courses. Many crit-
ics have highlighted the messages tacitly sent by legal educators about
professional responsibility.10 0 The Carnegie Report focuses on what might
be called the interpretive attitude that should be taken toward the law gov-
erning lawyers. Its concern is that if legal ethics is taught as a legal doctri-
nal subject, then students will implicitly be encouraged to apply the same
95. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
96. See, e.g., John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33
VAND. L. Rv. 551 (1980).
97. Mark J. Bennett, Hart and Raz on the Non-Instrumental Moral Value of the Rule of Law:
A Reconsideration, 30 L. & PHIL. 603, 634-35 (2011).
98. Id. at 609.
99. This is the argument of Chapter 3 in WENDEL, supra note 18, at 86-122, and can be
summarized only briefly here.
100. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145 (1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can a
Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3 (1991); Ronald M. Pipkin, Law
School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FouND.
REs. J. 247 (1979).
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interpretive methodology to the law regulating their own conduct as they
would when advising clients about their legal obligations. What is that in-
terpretive attitude?
When legal ethics courses focus exclusively on the law of lawyer-
ing, they can convey a sense that attorneys' behavior is bounded
only by sanctions such as the threat of malpractice charges and
give the impression that most practicing lawyers are motivated
primarily by self-interest and will refrain from unethical behavior
only when it is in their immediate self-interest to do so.' 0'
There are actually two different claims packed into this passage. One
is about motivation or character ("most practicing lawyers are motivated
primarily by self-interest") and will be considered in the next section. The
other claim is about interpretation and might be called the Holmesian bad
man attitude.' 02 This is the view that the content of legal obligations is
defined by a prediction of when officials will impose sanctions on conduct.
The image of the Holmesian bad man comes from Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr.'s definition of law in terms of a prediction of how relevant legal
officials might decide particular cases; significantly, the perspective from
which this prediction is made is that of a citizen who is interested only in
avoiding legal penalties that might attach to his conduct.10 3 The label "bad"
may be misleading. The bad citizen is not necessarily morally bad; rather,
she is "disinclined to obey stupid laws just because they are the law."104
The Holmesian bad man maintains that the law creates only prudential rea-
sons for action. Prudential reasons appeal to interests an actor already has,
such as maximizing her well-being. To the extent paying a penalty is less
costly in terms of the actor's utility than refraining from the conduct, the
balance of prudential reasons would direct the actor to violate the conduct
rule. However, the Holmesian bad man stance begs an important question
about what it means to comply with the law. A hypothetical "bad" citizen
may believe that a conduct rule is a nullity unless it is backed by a sanction
that the citizen would rather not pay, but this is not the only view that one
can take of conduct rules. The bad citizen obeys the law only out of self-
interest-i.e., because in some cases the remedial rule has the desired deter-
rent effect. In this way, the bad citizen's concern with the law is no differ-
ent from the reasons that she would have for giving money to a mugger. To
put it a bit less bluntly, the costs of noncompliance with law are no different
from any other cost that might be weighed against the benefits to be real-
ized by doing something.
101. CARNEGIE REPORY, supra note 3, at 149.
102. W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1473, 1499 n.2 (2006).
103. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459-62 (1897).
104. Frederick Schauer, Critical Notice, 24 CAN. J. Pun.. 495, 500 (1994) (reviewing ROGER
SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1992)).
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A very different attitude toward the law would be manifested in a citi-
zen looking to the law as a source of reasons for action in themselves, not
just as a way of predicting when state officials will do unpleasant things,
like locking her in jail. H.L.A. Hart argued that jurisprudential theories ac-
cepting the bad man definition of law, like Austin's command-sanction the-
ory or the American legal realism of the 1930s, lacked the conceptual
resources to account for the possibility of legal officials accepting the law
as a source of obligation. He went further and argued that it is necessarily a
feature of a legal system, as opposed to an accidental convergence of be-
havior by would-be legal officials, that judges regard the rule of recognition
of a legal system from the internal point of view, i.e., as creating an obliga-
tion to consider only certain sources of norms as part of the law of the
society.'0o This does not mean judges may not have other motivations, such
as gaining prestige or avoiding embarrassing reversals by appellate courts.
Hart emphasizes that "facts about beliefs and motives, are not necessary for
the truth of a statement that a person had an obligation to do something."lO6
Whatever specific motivations a judge may have, however, there must be
something distinctive about law that provides a different sort of reason for
action-otherwise there would be no such thing as a legal system as op-
posed to a fortuitous convergence of behavior by a bunch of people sitting
on high benches wearing black robes. The law must make a practical differ-
ence to the way a judge decides a case. Otherwise, there would be no way
to account for the distinguishing features of law, such as its generality, cer-
tainty, stability, and other virtues associated with the rule of law. One impli-
cation of this theory of law is that certain kinds of arguments can be ruled
out as not belonging to the domain of law. A client who argues that he
should prevail on a motion to compel discovery because he is rich, attrac-
tive, or powerful would be making a conceptual mistake.o 7
I have argued that, if the internal perspective on the rule of recognition
is mandatory for judges because of considerations of objectivity and sys-
tematicity, it is equally mandatory for lawyers.'0o A lawyer must treat the
law as imposing obligations on the client, and because the lawyer's own
duty is to represent the client faithfully within the law, the law imposes
obligations on the lawyer as well. The opposite of the internal point of view
manifests itself in legal practice as the attitude that lawyers can, and should,
treat the law instrumentally, as merely an impediment to their clients' goals
rather than as a source of obligation. This attitude valorizes "creative and
aggressive" structuring of transactions, "zealous" advocacy, and an exces-
105. H.L.A. HAirr, THE CONCEPT F LAW 116 (2d ed. 1994).
106. Id. at 83.
107. Heidi Feldman once offered me an excellent illustration of this kind of conceptual inco-
herence, which she attributed to Peter Railton: "Shut up, he argued." Try as I might I cannot find a
citation to Railton saying this, so I will just cite my conversation with Heidi.
108. Wendel, supra note 102, at 1492-93.
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sively private view of legal obligations that runs only to the client and does
not include obligations to courts, third parties, or a general obligation to
interpret legal texts in good faith. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the rea-
sons why the law is entitled to respect, namely that it provides a way to
justify our actions in terms that reflect the interests of all affected persons-
reasons in the first person plural, so to speak. Thus, there is a bridge be-
tween the internal standards regulating legal argumentation and broader
moral concerns. The law permits the transformation of brute demands into
claims of right, and for this reason it is a significant social achievement.
One way to push back on the Holmesian bad man attitude is to take the
perspective of ordinary morality. The Carnegie Report approvingly de-
scribes a law school course on ethics in health care professions, which re-
quires students to analyze issues "as a human being and as part of the
hospital administration.""o' Legal ethics courses often take this perspective,
for example, in working through whether there is a conflict between the
legal duty of confidentiality and the ordinary moral considerations that tend
to favor disclosure in a case like Spaulding.''o The implication is that the
perspective of ordinary morality is the only way to counteract the implicit
messages sent to law students elsewhere in the curriculum. As the next sec-
tion suggests, a critical, objective perspective by itself might be insufficient.
Professionals must also possess the requisite character traits. Only a virtu-
ous lawyer, reasoning from the standpoint of being a human being as a part
of the legal system, can adequately resolve the sorts of ethical dilemmas
that lawyers encounter in practice.
Before considering virtue ethics, however, I would like to briefly fore-
shadow the principal thesis of this paper by suggesting a distinction related
to internal and external points of view but more familiar to practicing law-
yers. This is the distinction between the mindset of litigators and that of
lawyers advising clients on the law. On this thesis, the relevant excellence
or virtue of lawyers is not related to virtue qua human being but to excel-
lence at interpreting and applying the law-that is, engaging in the sort of
legal reasoning and advising that makes up the everyday work of lawyers.
To illustrate this distinction in the context of the law governing lawyers,
consider a well known case, United States v. Gellene,'' in which a partner
at a large New York City law firm was convicted of bankruptcy fraud for
failing to disclose the representation of a related party while representing
the debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case. Gellene is a great teaching
case because on its face it is baffling that an experienced bankruptcy partner
at a major law firm could have so thoroughly misunderstood the applicable
law, particularly a bankruptcy rule requiring disclosure of "any connection"
109. CARNEGIm REPORT, supra note 3, at 155.
110. See, e.g., HAZARD El AL., supra note 35, at 3-8 (discussing Spaulding from the stand-
point of law and ordinary morality).
111. 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999).
520 [Vol. 9:2
2011] SHOULD LAW SCHOOLS TEACH ... ? 521
the firm had with any other party in interest.' 12 Explanations of the part-
ner's failure generally note the compensation structure at the firm, which
placed the lawyer in question, John Gellene, in a subordinate role.113 Be-
cause he represented debtors in corporate restructuring proceedings, Gel-
lene lacked a stable base of repeat-player clients. (If he were doing his job
well, at least, his clients would not need his services again.) He was be-
holden to allies within the firm, including mergers and acquisitions partner
Larry Lederman, who referred clients to Gellene. Because of his representa-
tion of investment funds, Lederman was a much more successful "rain-
maker,"114 and therefore had considerably more political clout than Gellene
in the firm. Lederman was therefore in a position to pressure Gellene, sub-
tly but unmistakably, to leave one of Lederman' s clients off the required
disclosure to the bankruptcy court.
On the assumption that Gellene was not an outright crook, however,
there must have been some way for him to justify an omission that was
subsequently determined to constitute bankruptcy fraud and violation of the
federal false-swearing statute.' 15 One possibility is that he took a litigator's
mindset with respect to the governing law. The firm did not concurrently
have a formal attorney-client relationship with any of the creditors in the
Chapter 11 proceeding (with one exception, which the court treats as insig-
nificant"'); it did, however, concurrently represent constituents and related
entities to one of the creditors in the bankruptcy. The creditor in question
112. Frn. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a).
113. See the excellent book about the case, Mn TON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KurI: THE
FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004) and the reviews in Steven Lubet, Book Reviews: A
Series of Reviews of Eat What You Kill by Milton C. Regan, Jr., 19 GLo. J. LEGAL ETICs 275
(2006).
114. Lawyers sometimes divide the world of partners into finders, minders, and grinders.
Finders bring in clients; minders keep them happy; grinders do the necessary legal work. At
Gellene's law firm, as in others using a so-called "eat what you kill" compensation system, finders
were much more powerful than grinders; unfortunately for Gellene, he was a grinder. (In another
folksy description, Lederman was the chicken catcher and Gellene the chicken plucker.)
115. See HAZARD ET AT., supra note 35, at 74-75 (discussing the statutes violated by Gellene).
116. See 182 F.3d at 583 n.6. The court cites a bankruptcy matter pending in Colorado, in
which the court understood that Gellene's firm had represented South Street. In his discussion of
this representation, Regan cites internal firm conflicts-checking procedures that listed Greycliff
Partners as the client in the so-called Busse Broadcasting matter, and also refers to firm lawyers
treating Salovaara as the client. REGAN, supra note 113, at 146-47. The representation of small,
informally governed entities such as partnerships and closely held corporations is fraught with
peril for lawyers, who may find themselves inadvertently acquiring implied-in-fact professional
obligations to individuals or entities they had not intended to regard as clients. See HAZARD El
AL., supra note 35, at 541-67. Significantly, although it refers to South Street as the firm's client,
the court does not rely on a formal attorney-client relationship existing between the firm and
South Street. This is due mostly to the focus on Gellene's violation of the bankruptcy rule, which
requires disclosure of connections with all interested parties, not just clients. But analysis of the
representation under generally applicable conflicts-of-interest principles as stated in MODEL
RULES R. 1.7(a)(2) reaches the same result. Gellene's representation of the debtor is materially
limited by the firm's relationship with Salovaara and Greycliff Partners, regardless of whether
South Street is formally a client of the firm.
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
was South Street Funds, a limited investment fund, which was managed by
an entity called Greycliff Partners, in which there were two (human) part-
ners, Salovaara and Eckert."' The firm represented Salovaara in a dispute
with Eckert over their partnership agreement and also represented Greycliff
in other acquisitions. A lawyer might make an argument with a straight face
that the firm's representation of Salovaara and Greycliff was not tanta-
mount to a representation of South Street. For one thing, the rule on entity
representation makes clear that a lawyer for an organization, such as South
Street, represents the entity itself, not any of its constituents."' This means
that South Street, not Salovaara, was formally the client of the firm. In
addition, the representation of one entity generally does not create a lawyer-
client relationship with affiliated entities.'9 Thus, the representation of
Greycliff, the manager of South Street, was not equivalent to the representa-
tion of South Street. Indeed, as Regan reports, John Gellene believed that he
was not required to disclose the representation of Salovaara because he was
not a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding. 120 This is irrelevant to the in-
terpretation of the bankruptcy rule but would be the sort of argument that
might occur to a litigator trying to establish, after the fact, that a firm had
not violated the generally applicable concurrent conflicts rule.
As it happens, I believe it is also irrelevant to the interpretation of the
general concurrent conflicts rule because the firm's relationship with
Salovaara can create a material limitation on its ability to represent the
debtor.12' The reason is that the firm must represent the debtor with due
regard to the debtor's duty of impartiality among the various creditors; the
bankruptcy rule requiring disclosure is intended to support that obligation
by providing information to creditors so they can monitor the debtor for
compliance with its duty. 122 Nevertheless, one could imagine Gellene con-
vincing himself that he was not required to disclose the representation of
Salovaara, which happened to be the result that Lederman preferred.
The problem with adopting the litigator's mindset in this case was that
Gellene was not defending conduct that was entirely in the past. Rather, he
was involved in directing the firm's course of conduct. The question he
should have been asking was not "is there some argument that passes the
threshold of plausibility that I could give to avoid sanctions?" but rather
117. See REGAN, supra note 113, at 138, 144-58 (providing the factual background on the
firm's client relationships).
118. MoDEL RuLEs R. 1.13(a).
119. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7 cmt. 34.
120. See REGAN, supra note 113, at 148.
121. See MODnE RUtLEs R. 1.7(a)(2).
122. See REGAN, supra note 113, at 139-40, 142-44 (discussing the obligation of counsel for
the debtor to act impartially with respect to the interests of all creditors-as a "caretaker for the
value of this company for the benefit of all of its creditors," as Gellene put it, and the objection of
a major secured creditor, Jackson National Life (JNL), to the reorganization plan proposed by
Gellene, which in the view of JNL would unfairly disadvantage it relative to other secured credi-
tors, particularly South Street).
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"what are my firm's obligations?" Some would respond that the second
question collapses back into the first because the question of what one's
obligations are, by definition, is the same as whether some argument can be
given for why sanctions should not be imposed. This is the Holmesian bad
man stance: On this view the firm's legal obligations can be restated in the
form of a prediction of whether sanctions will be imposed, which takes into
account how likely it is that Gellene's client-identity argument would be
accepted by a court.
To be clear, I have no quarrel with lawyers presenting predictive judg-
ments in exactly that form. Suppose the managing partner of the firm asked
Gellene whether it was likely that the firm would be disqualified from rep-
resenting the debtor in the bankruptcy matter because of its concurrent rep-
resentation of Salovaara. There would be nothing wrong with an answer of
the form, "I think we have an argument for why we shouldn't be disquali-
fied from representing the debtor, but it's not a sure thing; maybe we have a
25% chance of prevailing on a motion to disqualify." But that is very differ-
ent from a statement that the law permits the simultaneous representation of
Salovaara and the debtor, and the failure to see this distinction is a serious
jurisprudential mistake. It assumes that rights and duties are matters of
probabilistic judgments, not an interpretive process that seeks to determine
the content of the law. Of course there may be uncertainty, legal indetermi-
nacy, and disagreement about the content of the law. There is seldom one
right answer to any question of what the law permits or requires. Lawyers
frequently are called upon to exercise judgment, and one reason why pro-
fessional expertise is not easily modeled or reduced to something else is
that judgments are the sort of thing about which experienced practitioners
can differ.
The possibility of differences, however, does not mean that there is no
such thing as an egregiously inappropriate or inadequately grounded judg-
ment. From the point of view of impartial legal advising, Gellene's reading
of the rules was too tendentious, too much of an advocate's approach, to
satisfy the client's need to understand what the law really required in this
case. As it happens, the "client" here was Gellene and his firm. The law
governing lawyers places lawyers in the uncomfortable and unfamiliar posi-
tion of being the recipient of legal advice. Thus, Gellene ended up mislead-
ing his client-i.e., himself-by taking an aggressively adversarial
interpretive stance toward the governing law. The result was disaster. Gel-
lene was sentenced to serve two concurrent fifteen-month sentences for
bankruptcy fraud.'2 3 A lawyer who had been interested in discerning the
content of the law governing disclosure of related-party representations
would not have made the same mistake and would still be practicing law
today.
123. See REGAN, supra note 113, at 287-88.
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D. Virtue-Theoretic Concepts
The question naturally arises, therefore, whether someone like Gellene
lacked the requisite traits of character that a good lawyer must possess. The
Carnegie Report alludes frequently to the character of lawyers and law stu-
dents, in part to distinguish it from a more technical body of information
that may be acquired in the course of professional education. It is a com-
monplace that many incoming law students expect to learn a bunch of rules,
and certainly there is quite a bit of doctrine to familiarize oneself with in the
first year. Students learn the names of different estates in land, the elements
of torts and crimes, the rules for calculating damages for breach of contract,
and so on. Yet the ability to recall this knowledge is not what best charac-
terizes the practice of law by expert lawyers.
In actual professional practice, it is often not the particular knowl-
edge or special skill of the lawyer or physician that is critical,
important as these are. At moments when judgment is at a pre-
mium, when the practitioner is called on to intervene or react with
integrity for the values of the profession, it is the quality of the
individual's formation that is at issue. The holistic qualities count:
the sense of intuitive engagement, of habitual disposition that en-
able the practitioner to perform reliably and artfully.124
What the Report calls "holistic qualities" are better known in moral
philosophy as virtues or traits of character. In places the Report seems con-
cerned primarily with the motivation a lawyer would have to comply with
ethical obligations. In other places, however, it seems to have in mind
something closer to virtue ethics. In Gellene's case, a disposition to ap-
proach the rules with a more impartial mindset may have prevented the
fiasco resulting from his failure to disclose the related-party representations.
It is therefore not surprising that critics of legal ethics education point to its
failure to address considerations of character.
Some philosophers do insist that knowledge of moral duties and rules
alone is not sufficient to ensure compliance with the demands of moral-
ity. 125 Rather, it is essential that people possess sufficiently stable disposi-
tions to do the right things for the right reasons.12 6 These dispositions
cannot be so general that they are essentially just restatements of the re-
124. CARNEGm REPORT, supra note 3, at 85.
125. See generally ROSALIND HURSTHousE, ON VIRTUE ETHIs (1999); MICHAEL SLorn,
F1omt MORALrIY Fo VIRIE (1992); PHILLIPPA Foo, VIRUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
MORAL PmiosopHy (1978); Edmund Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, in REviSIONS: CHANGING PVR-
SPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILosopHy 92 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds., 1983); John
McDowell, Virtue and Reason, 62 THE MONISi 331 (1979); G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral
Philosophy, 33 Pi-nLosoPrHY 1 (1958). In legal ethics, see, for example, Dean Cocking & Justin
Oakley, Professional Interpretation and Judgment, and the Integrity of Lawyers, in PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY 68 (Tim Dare & W. Bradley Wendel eds., 2010).
126. See JUSTIN OAKLEY & DEAN COCKING, VIRTUE ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL Rors 12
(2001).
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quirements of rules or duties. An honest person refrains from lying or cheat-
ing, not because it is wrong to lie or cheat, but because the person is
honest. 1 2 7 A courageous person might risk her life because "someone had to
do it" or "I thought I could save him if I did that" but not because it would
win her fame and glory or because she hoped to claim a reward.128 A virtu-
ous person does the right things for the right reasons.
It is often objected that virtue ethics fails to provide action-guiding
standards.129 Virtue ethicists' response is that an ethics of rules or principles
also may fail to guide action because "a certain amount of . . . practical
wisdom (phronesis) might be required both to interpret the rules and to
determine which rule was most appropriately to be applied in a particular
case.""o A different version of the action-guidingness objection, however,
would be that virtues and virtue rules ("act honestly," for example) gain
sufficient content to guide action only in relation to some domain of con-
cern and some end to be furthered."' One response to this objection, of-
fered by many virtue ethicists who are concerned with general morality, is
to follow Aristotle and appeal to what makes a good life qua human being;
virtues are then those character traits and dispositions that are conducive to
living this kind of life.' 3 2 Within a particular social role or profession, how-
ever, one may speak of virtues that benefit a practitioner with respect to that
particular context.' Those virtues then serve as a regulative ideal-stan-
dards of excellence within the particular practice or craft to which a practi-
tioner can aspire. Being a good jazz pianist means having internalized
127. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 125, at 28-29, 123-31. In her entry on virtue ethics in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rosalind Hursthouse notes that a range of reactions-some
emotional, some practical-distinguish the honest person from someone who merely follows
rules.
Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to
have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes,
deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those
who succeed by dishonest means rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsur-
prised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed
when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on.
Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, SIANoRD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue! (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
128. See HURSIHOUSE, supra note 125, at 127-28 (offering the reasons of a courageous
person).
129. See, e.g., Christine Swanton, Can Virtue Ethics Provide Legal Ethics, in DARE &
WENDEL, in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY 201 (Tim Dare & W. Bradley
Wendel eds., 2010) (considering this objection and responses, in the context of legal ethics).
130. HURSTHOUSE, supra note 125, at 40. This is often called the tuquoque argument, see
Christine Swanton, Can Virtue Ethics Provide Legal Ethics, in DARE & WENDEL, supra note 129,
at 201, which might informally be known as the "oh yeah, can you do any better?" response.
131. Christine Swanton, Can Virtue Ethics Provide Legal Ethics, in DARE & WENDEL, supra
note 129, at 203-04.
132. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS
NEED THE VIRTUES 63-79 (1999).
133. See id. at 65-66 (MacIntyre's examples are of a food that is good for all people to eat, as
distinct from a food that would be good for a marathon runner in training to eat).
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standards of excellence through a process of apprenticeship including lis-
tening to the greats like Thelonious Monk, Oscar Peterson, and Bill Evans,
learning something about jazz theory, and, of course, playing the piano for
hours and hours.134 While it may be difficult to codify standards of excel-
lence, to articulate them in a theoretical way, they are quite real as a prop-
erty of the craft itself. Playing jazz piano simply is to accept and be guided
by the virtues internal to this particular activity. In the context of legal eth-
ics, one might therefore say that being a good lawyer is a matter of being
guided by the habits, traits, and dispositions that tend to conduce toward
realizing the goals of the profession.135 This means that "an appropriately
action-guiding profession ethic cannot be generated without specifying
what the appropriate orientation and essential guiding concerns of the par-
ticular profession ought to be."' 6
With respect to virtuous lawyering, one might ask what is the end to be
pursued by a virtuous lawyer and over what domain does the activity of
lawyering extend. On one conception of legal ethics, the domain of lawy-
erly virtue is the client's interests; that is, the lawyer should be understood,
first and foremost, as the friend or champion of her client, with the rights of
non-clients, and the public interest, subordinated to the client's rights."' A
virtuous lawyer, on this view, would not disclose the confidential informa-
tion in Spaulding, even if she might feel a certain amount of regret about
the harm that foreseeably will result. On the other hand, others argue that
virtue for lawyers requires balancing the rights of third parties against the
rights of clients, not necessarily privileging client interests above the legiti-
mate interests of others. This version of the virtuous lawyer would exercise
judgment to determine whether the threatened harm to the plaintiff in
Spaulding was severe enough to warrant breaching the duty of confidential-
ity. Perhaps virtue for lawyers includes knowing which of these conceptions
should apply in a given case. Some clients may be entitled to full-throated
zealous advocacy, while the representation of others should be tempered by
a regard for the interests of others. But this move threatens to make virtue
ethics for lawyers into a hall of mirrors in which the answer to every ques-
tion about the content of the virtues refers to even more considerations of
virtue. Virtue, or judgment, thus ends up becoming a black box in the the-
ory so that the result depends on something about which we can say little
except that it must be what a virtuous agent would have done.'13 There has
to be something that establishes the parameters of the exercise of virtue, and
134. OAKLEY & COCKING, supra note 126, at 25-26 (using the jazz pianist example).
135. See id. at 74.
136. Id. at 75.
137. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
138. See DARE, supra note 38, at 111-12 (criticizing virtue-ethics accounts of To Kill a Mock-
ingbird in which Atticus's decision, at the end of the novel, to lie to protect Boo Radley can be
explained as a matter of "judgment" rather than as a principled decision).
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to avoid circularity, the standard cannot be that which a good person would
do.
In other words, before anyone starts talking about virtues in legal eth-
ics and the practice of law, it is essential to have a view about the "essential
guiding concerns" of the law, the legal system, and the legal profession. I
have argued that they are values associated with the rule of law, including
the basic equality of all citizens, the duty to treat one another with respect,
and constraints on the exercise of arbitrary power. 13 9 From these guiding
concerns one can then infer specific principles and virtues that characterize
good lawyering. Of course, if one has a different understanding of the es-
sential guiding concerns of the law, one will reach different conclusions
about the nature of excellence in the practice of law.' 40 For present pur-
poses, there is no cause to reargue the underlying normative case. It is im-
portant, however, to keep in mind that these issues must be settled before
legal educators can think meaningfully about the virtues that belong to an
appropriate conception of the ethical practice of law. In the remainder of
this paper, I will argue for a particular account of excellence in the practice
of law. The guiding principle of this conception of virtuous lawyering is the
value of legality, which I believe is the most plausible account of the nor-
mative underpinning of the lawyer's role. John Gellene would have dis-
closed the related-party representation if he had been suitably motivated by
the value of legality, and it is in this sense that we can talk about lawyers as
possessing or lacking the requisite traits of character.
1. Legal Judgment and Decision-Making
Donald Schon, the previously mentioned philosopher of education who
studied how professionals implement knowledge in practice, began his
study of professional education with a nice metaphor of the topography of
professional practice in which the high ground overlooks a swamp.' 4 ' The
high ground consists of problems requiring the application of technical ra-
tionality-that is, figuring out which means to use to achieve an end that is
already defined. These problems turn out to be relatively uninteresting,
however, particularly in comparison with those in the swamp, where figur-
ing out how to frame the problem is a question that necessarily precedes the
application of technical rationality, and this initial framing question requires
the exercise of discretion and judgment. For example, a civil engineer asked
to build a road will think in terms of the requirements of technical rational-
ity and consider factors like soil conditions, stability, and drainage. Decid-
ing whether or where to build a road, however, implicates "a complex and
139. See WENDFi, supra note 18.
140. See Alice Woolley's contribution to this symposium, Alice Woolley, Intuition and The-
ory in Legal Ethics Teaching, 9 U. Si. THOMAs L.J. 285 (2011).
141. See DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE RYELECIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW
DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROVESSIONs 3-4 (1987).
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ill-defined melange of topographical, financial, economic, environmental,
and political factors."l 4 2 Essentially, the Carnegie Report faults law school
ethics courses for staying on the high ground and not getting students down
into the swamp: "Such a narrow focus [on the law of lawyering] misses an
important dimension of ethical development-the capacity and inclination
to notice moral issues when they are embedded in complex and ambiguous
situations, as they usually are in legal practice."143 The implication is that
law school teaches only technical rationality and does nothing to train stu-
dents to deal with "swampy" questions, including how to recognize and
frame ethical issues and how to exercise the faculty of practical reasoning
or judgment.'44 To put the point slightly differently, moral decision making
in the context of legal practice is less about deliberation and more about
action or performance-hence, the language of "capacity and inclination"
used in the Carnegie Report.
To some extent this critique is belied by the appreciative attitude to-
ward the case-dialogue (a/k/a "Socratic") teaching method taken elsewhere
in the Report. It refers to the case-dialogue method as a cognitive appren-
ticeship, aimed not so much at imparting knowledge as training students in
",a particular way of thinking, a distinctive stance toward the world." 4 5 One
aspect of that distinctive stance is awareness of the legal salience of certain
features of a situation. 146 As law students quickly discover, "facts" are not
just facts. Rather, as the Report rightly observes, they result "from complex
processes of interpretation that are shaped by pressures of litigation."' 4 7
The case-dialogue method also attempts to convey values and dispositions,
along with information. Ordinary human problems are translated into legal
terms, and this translation is itself a process, something that requires prac-
tice and performance under the guidance of an experienced practitioner. 148
Some law students perceive this as constraining. The Carnegie Report
quotes a student at NYU who praised the first-year lawyering course for its
rigor, but then added: "[T]hat, too, is a box. The creative process is ex-
tremely limited. I'm eager to place legal reasoning into an interdisciplinary
context." 4 9 To rephrase this objection in Schin's terms, the student seems
to be saying that law schools have deluded themselves into thinking they
142. Id. at 4.
143. See CARNEGm REPORT, supra note 3, at 149.
144. See id. at 149 (noting that an important dimension of ethical development is "the capacity
and inclination to notice moral issues when they are embedded in complex and ambiguous
situations").
145. Id. at 51.
146. See HERMAN, supra note 61, at 77-78 (discussing the importance of "rules of moral
salience" that pick out the features of the world that have significance for moral decision-making).
147. CARNEGIm REPORT, supra note 3, at 53.
148. See id. at 4.
149. Id. at 41.
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are dealing with "swampy" questions but in fact have merely replaced one
species of technical rationality with another.
As the next section seeks to demonstrate, however, legal reasoning
does not aim to transcend the swamp but to provide a way through it. Legal
practice is the direct engagement with non-technical issues-call them
moral, social, "policy," or what have you-using a style of reasoning that
seeks to resolve these issues using techniques and procedures that respect
the value of legality. Lawyers and judges do not refer back directly to first-
order moral concerns but make arguments based on recognized considera-
tions that are internal to law. These can be techniques of common law rea-
soning, such as analogizing and distinguishing cases, synthesizing a rule
from a series of cases, reading holdings broadly or narrowly, appealing to
the policy rationale underlying a rule, or arguing for new legal principles or
the abrogation of old ones; techniques of statutory interpretation, including
ordinary language or "dictionary" analysis, reliance on the syntax and struc-
ture of statutes, making use of legislative history, following the post-enact-
ment history of a statute, reading it in conjunction with other similar
statutes, using traditional canons of construction like ejusdem generis, etc.;
and making use of interpretive conventions that regulate the more specific
interpretive practices described here. First-order moral reasons figure into
this reasoning process only indirectly. To put the point differently, when the
NYU student quoted in the Carnegie Report wants to place legal reasoning
in an interdisciplinary context, he or she is seeking to stand outside legal
reasoning, regarding it as an observer rather than a participant. Legal rea-
soning is not sealed off from first-order morality, but the connections are
indirect. Doing legal reasoning properly means, in many cases, not resorting
to the methods of economics, philosophy, or some other discipline. There is
a difference between arguing that some tort rule (negligence or strict liabil-
ity, for example) would be more efficient in a given context and arguing
that the law does, or should, reflect negligence or strict liability. Legal rea-
soning is not just the application of theory to practice but the application of
theory through practice and in practice.
The Carnegie Report defines the practice of law as "engaged exper-
tise," the mediation between theory and practice, or the faculty of judgment
or practical reasoning. It observes: "Like the experienced physician, the le-
gal professional must move between the detached stance of theoretical rea-
soning and a highly contextual understanding of client, case, and
situation.""'o There is no algorithm to model the application of law to facts,
because facts take on significance only in light of the law, the client's goals,
and the interests of other parties. Moreover, understanding how to do legal
reasoning correctly requires immersion in the practice and a period of ap-
prenticeship before the internal standards regulating the practice become
150. CARNEGIE REPORI, supra note 3, at 115.
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perspicuous to the practitioner. Along these lines, theological ethicist Stan-
ley Hauerwas frequently refers to his childhood apprenticeship working
with his bricklayer father.1s' In order to learn to lay brick, Hauerwas writes,
it is not sufficient to be told how to do it. Not only are there many sub-skills
that must be learned (how to mix the mortar and build a scaffold, for exam-
ple), and not only is there a specialized language (such as understanding
what it means to "frog" the mortar), but there is a necessary element of
simply performing the relevant tasks, maybe failing in the attempt, and be-
ing corrected by more experienced bricklayers. Some tasks require having a
feel for conditions-say, the density of the bricks ("clinkers," the bricks
from the bottom of the kiln, being particularly tricky to work with) or the
consistency of the mortar-and while this feel may be difficult to articulate,
it is the sort of tacit knowledge that experienced bricklayers possess, which
is one of the reasons why their jobs turn out looking better than jobs per-
formed by novices. Therefore, there is no substitute for doing when trying
to learn how to lay bricks. "God knows how many four-foot-high walls I
built, tore down, only to build again,"l 52 Hauerwas writes. "That is the way
you learned how to lay brick."15 From these childhood lessons Hauerwas
concludes that professions, as well as ethics generally, are practices that
must be learned by immersion and by subordinating one's own judgment to
that of an expert. "Through such an apprenticeship we seek to acquire the
intelligence and virtues necessary to become skilled practitioners."154
Appeals to professional virtue and the insistence that professional ex-
pertise cannot be theorized completely in terms of non-craft-specific con-
siderations may strike some readers as an attempt to mystify non-
professionals and therefore entrench the illegitimate monopoly enjoyed by
some occupational group over the provision of services. If robots could lay
brick as well as Stanley Hauerwas's father, bricklayers would be out of
business. Thus, if an online legal document preparation service like
LegalZoom can create wills, trust documents, and articles of incorporation
as good as those prepared by a local lawyer, then lawyers may try to find
some way to argue that the activities of LegalZoom should be restricted.'
Of course, lawyers would not come out and argue that they are trying to
151. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, HANNAH'S CHILD: A THEvOLOGIAN'S MEMOIR 28-33
(2010) (discussing time Hauerwas spent "on the job" with his father); SIANLEY HAUERWAS, Ai-
TER CHRISTnNDoM? How THE CHURCH IS TO BEHAVE IF FREEDOM, JUSTICE, AND A CHRISTIAN
NATION ARE BAD IDEAS 101-07 (1991) (discussing what it takes to learn "how to lay a brick").
152. HALERWAS, HANNAH'S CHILD, supra note 151, at 30.
153. Id.; see also DARE, supra note 39, at 103-04 (using Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus's example
of learning to drive).
154. HALERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM?, supra note 151, at 103.
155. See Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Can Continue to Offer Documents in Missouri
Under Proposed Settlement, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 23, 2011, 6:32 a.m.), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/legalzoom can continue to offer documents in missouri-under proposed
settle/. In August 2011, LegalZoom settled a class-action lawsuit in Missouri charging it with the
unauthorized practice of law. See id. Previously it entered into a consent decree with the Washing-
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protect their monopoly rents. Sociologists of the professions have fre-
quently pointed out how claims of distinctive professional expertise could
be used to justify the enhanced status of professionals or the freedom of
professions from the regulations to which other industries might be sub-
jected.5 6 The "guild power"' of professions must be defended by appeal
to considerations such as consumer protection, which have wider normative
significance.' Thus, professions and society enter into an implicit quid pro
quo, under which professions obtain insulation from market or regulatory
pressures in exchange for an agreement to practice their craft in the public
interest.
Moreover, the specialized nature of professional knowledge means that
clients, affected non-clients, and society as a whole are not in a good posi-
tion to monitor professionals to see whether they are, in fact, practicing
their profession in the interests of society."' In the lawyer-client relation-
ship the asymmetry of knowledge and expertise creates what economists
would call agency costs, arising from the difficulty clients have in monitor-
ing the competence and loyalty of lawyers they retain. In the broader con-
text, society as a whole must take on faith, to some extent, the
representation by the legal profession that there is some value in what law-
yers do and that lawyers (at least most lawyers, most of the time) are in fact
acting in accordance with the constitutive norms of the profession that are
in the public interest.
The burden of justification in this paper is somewhat different because
I am writing for lawyers and legal educators, not members of the public
who are not legally trained. What I hope to establish in the concluding sec-
tion of this paper is that someone who has acquired the expertise of legal
analysis can tell the difference between a good legal argument and one that
is inadequately supported. If this is a tenable distinction, then the "good" in
lawyering can be understood not directly in moral terms but as a function of
how well a lawyer expresses respect for the law and the legal system while
representing her clients. This conception of legal ethics is not meant to
drive a wedge between law and morality but to emphasize the political and
institutional aspects of moral reasoning. There is a difference between rea-
soning about what one ought to do in isolation and what one ought to do
ton State Attorney General's office, also based on the allegations that the company's electronic
document preparation service constituted the practice of law. See id.
156. See, e.g., STvrvN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF ExPERTS: THE CHANGING Roi F OF PRoFnSSION-
ALS IN POLIICS AND PUBLic LIFE 25-44 (1994); Eliot Freidson, Professionalisn as Model and
Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS / LAWYFRS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THF AMERICAN
LEGAL PRoFnsSION 215 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992);
HALLIDAY, supra note 16, at 34.
157. EiiIOTT A. KRAUSE, DFATH OF THF Gunus: PRoTnssIoNs, STATFS, AND THF ADVANCF
OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THF PRFSENT 20 passim (1996).
158. See, e.g., ANDREw ABBori, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DivISION
OF EXPERT LABOR 184-86 (1988).
159. See DARF, supra note 39, at 89.
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while also taking account of considerations such as whether the reasons for
one's action can apply to other relevantly similar actors; whether the stan-
dard governing one's action can be expressed in a general way that can be
understood and applied by other decision makers; and whether other deci-
sion makers ought to have relatively wide latitude to make discretionary
judgments or whether instead they should be constrained in their decision-
making authority as a way of safeguarding against arbitrary decisions or the
abuse of power. These considerations, which are familiar features of first-
year law courses, can be understood as a distinctive morality of the legal
system, emphasizing as it does the values of impartiality, stability, and con-
straints on the exercise of power. Thus, the following example, written in
the form of an interactive dialogue with the reader, is intended to show how
lawyers can do better or worse, as measured by the internal evaluative stan-
dards of an appropriately legal and institutional normative system.
II. AN EXTENDED EXAMPLE
The release of George Bush's memoirs in November 2010 rekindled a
long-running debate, in the United States and internationally, on the moral-
ity, efficacy, and legality of torture."'o In an interview broadcast on NBC
News after the publication of his book, Bush was asked specifically about
the practice of waterboarding. Central Intelligence Agency director Michael
Hayden had previously confirmed, in Congressional testimony on February
5, 2008, that the CIA used waterboarding on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
Abu Zubaida, and other al-Qaeda detainees at secret locations under CIA
control, known as "black sites," throughout the world with the cooperation
of foreign intelligence services.'"' (It was subsequently revealed that Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed was subjected to waterboarding an astonishing 183
times.)' 62 A few days after Hayden's testimony, on February 9, 2008, At-
torney General Michael Mukasey testified that lawyers in the Department
of Justice had concluded that waterboarding was legal and that the CIA had
acted according to this advice. Bush took the same line in his NBC News
interview. To interviewer Matt Lauer's question, "Why is waterboarding
legal?" Bush responded, "Because the lawyer said it's legal."6 3 Note that
the questioners here seem to make two related assumptions about the rela-
tionship between law and morality. First, if something is legal, then there is
160. Exhaustively documenting all aspects of this history would unnecessarily waste space
here. The reader is referred to several sources of support, including GOLDSMITH, supra note 25;
JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY oY How THIn WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A
WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 148 (2008); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMsEnD's MEMO
AND iHE BETRAYAL OF AMER1UCAN VALUES (2008).
161. See MAYER, supra note 160, at 148 (discussing "black sites" maintained by the CIA).
162. See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. Tirns, Apr. 20,
2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html.
163. See, e.g., Mark Colvin, Let's Talk About Torture, ABC NEws: Tin DRUM [AUSTRALIA],
Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.abc.net.aulnews/stories/2010/11/11/3063054.htm.
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at least a prima facie reason to believe that it should be permissible. One
might ask the follow-up question-"Even if it is legal, is it the sort of thing
the United States should be doing?"-but the legal permissibility of some
interrogation technique shifts the normative burden of proof to some extent.
The second assumption is that if government officials did something the
lawyers did not say was legal, they acted wrongfully. Perhaps not wrong-
fully, all things considered-that is, it may have been justified in some case
to violate the law-but again there is a subtle rhetorical allocation of the
burden here so that the legality of interrogation techniques assumed para-
mount importance.
In his attempt at justifying his administration's policies, Bush was re-
ferring to legal analysis provided by an elite group of lawyers within the
Department of Justice, called the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The OLC
exercises power delegated from the Attorney General of the United States
to advise the President and to issue legal opinions that are binding on the
entire executive branch unless overruled by the Attorney General. The most
difficult, serious legal questions involving the legality of government action
are referred to the OLC, which traditionally has employed some of the very
best available lawyers in the United States. Numerous OLC lawyers indeed
had provided legal advice, in the form of several lengthy memoranda, on
the legality of various "enhanced interrogation techniques," including
waterboarding. The memos do purport to provide a legal justification for
harsh interrogation tactics, including what most lawyers, as well as laype-
ople, would regard as torture. The quality of this advice was soundly criti-
cized by legal scholars, in the United States and internationally.16 4 As an
ostensive demonstration of the craft of legal reasoning, and the judgment
that (in my view) constitutes ethical professional practice, I would like to
consider one piece of the question of the legality of subjecting detainees to
a simulated drowning experience known as waterboarding. To keep the
analysis manageable, the following discussion will bracket numerous other
legal regulations, including international humanitarian law and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, and consider only the U.S. domestic statutory pro-
hibition on torture.
A. Waterboarding
The debate about the legality of waterboarding sometimes begins with
mistaken assumptions about what is actually involved in this interrogation
technique. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia gave an interview
with BBC Radio in which he ridiculed the moral objections raised by critics
of the Bush Administration's torture program:
Is it really so easy to determine that smacking someone in the
face to determine where he has hidden the bomb that is about to
164. See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
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blow up Los Angeles is prohibited in the Constitution? It would
be absurd to say you couldn't do that. And once you acknowledge
that, we're into a different game.1"s
Similarly, public debate over waterboarding was frequently character-
ized by references to "dunking someone in the water" or some other innoc-
uous-sounding treatment.' In fact, however, waterboarding is a truly
horrifying process, well described by a former instructor at the U.S. Navy's
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) School:
Waterboarding is controlled drowning that, in the American
model, occurs under the watch of a doctor, a psychologist, and an
interrogator, and a trained strap-in/strap-out team. It does not sim-
ulate drowning, as the lungs are actually filling with water. There
is no way to simulate that. The victim is drowning. How much the
victim is to drown depends on the desired result ... and the obsti-
nacy of the subject. A team doctor watches the quantity of water
that is ingested and for the physiological signs which show when
the drowning effect goes from painful psychological experience,
to horrific suffocating punishment to the final death spiral.
Waterboarding is slow motion suffocation with enough time to
contemplate the inevitability of black out and expiration-usually
the person goes into hysterics on the board. . . . When it is done
right it is controlled death. Its lack of physical scarring allows the
victim to recover and be threatened with its use again and
again. 167
This description will be important in light of the federal criminal stat-
ute proscribing torture, which differentiates between physical and mental
pain and suffering.
165. Law in Action, BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2008), http://bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006tgyl/broad
casts/2008/02.
166. Vice-President Dick Cheney agreed with the assertion that waterboarding is a "dunk in
the water." See Dan Eggen, Cheney's Remarks Fuel Torture Debate, WASH. Post, Oct. 27, 2006,
at A09, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/26/AR2006
102601521.html; Mark Tran, Cheney Endorses Simulated Drowning, GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/27/usa.guantanamo.
167. Malcolm Nance, Waterboarding is Torture .. . Period, SMALL WARS J. (Oct. 31, 2007,
1:30 p.m.), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/I0/waterboarding-is-torture-perio/. Among
other things, the SERE program trains American special forces, military pilots, and some other
uniformed service personnel to deal with torture that they might face in the hands of the enemy if
captured. The full article by former SERE instructor Malcolm Nance can be found in an online
magazine called Small Wars Journal, and excerpts appeared in various newspapers, including the
Independent (U.K.) and the New York Daily News. Id. For a similar description, by a former Navy
flight crew member who attended SERE training, see Richard E. Mezo, Why It Was Called
"Water Torture", WASH. Posi, Feb. 10, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/02/08/AR2008020803156.html. It should go without saying that the psychological
stress of undergoing waterboarding as part of a training program, where it is always possible to
ask members of one's own country's military to discontinue the treatment, is different from the
hopelessness induced by the same interrogation technique being employed by one's captors.
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B. The Torture Statute
Again, for the purpose of simplifying this example, the legal analysis
will consider only the domestic criminal law in the United States prohibit-
ing torture. 1" The relevant portion of the statute provides as follows:
As used in this chapter-
(1) "torture" means an act committed by a person acting under the
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to
lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or phys-
ical control;
(2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental
harm caused by or resulting from -
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of se-
vere physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened adminis-
tration or application, of mind-altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be sub-
jected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the ad-
ministration or application of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or personality [.]
The statute specifically applies to conduct outside the United States, 161
so it has extraterritorial effect at Bagram Air Base, secret "black sites"
maintained by the CIA, and any other location where detainees were sub-
jected to interrogation.
C. Statutory Analysis
Looking at the torture statute, and keeping in mind the nature of the
waterboarding process, is waterboarding legally permissible? The OLC
lawyers concluded that it is, so the question is whether this conclusion is
adequately supported by the governing law. The lawyers' argument concen-
trated on the term "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" in the stat-
ute. There were two principal lines of argument as to why waterboarding
did not cause "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" and thus did not
constitute prohibited torture.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
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1. The Emergency Health Care Benefits Statute
The first argument has been widely ridiculed, in the United States and
abroad. It is that the term "severe pain" is ambiguous and thus should be
understood with reference to other statutes that also use the term "severe
pain." Using other statutes as a point of reference, the lawyers created an
implausibly restrictive definition of torture: "The victim must experience
intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would
be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ fail-
ure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body functions
will likely result."' The lawyers drew support for this narrow definition
from an unlikely source, namely a federal statute defining an "emergency
condition" for the purpose of obtaining health care benefits.17 1 That statute
defines an emergency condition as one "manifesting itself by acute symp-
toms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a prudent lay
person ... could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical atten-
tion to result in . . . (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii)
serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." What do you think? Is it a
legitimate legal argument to infer the definition of severe pain from the
emergency health care benefits statute to the torture statute? In particular,
are the OLC lawyers correct in concluding that severe pain is limited to that
accompanying organ failure or death?
Most commentators have thought that the OLC lawyers' interpretation
argument relying on the health care benefits statute misses the mark com-
pletely. 172 They contend that the emergency health care benefits statute is
not setting out a definition of severe pain in terms of organ failure or dys-
function but using severe pain as one symptom among many-including
organ failure or dysfunction-which might justify a prudent lay person in
concluding that a person is in need of immediate medical attention. In terms
of the syntax of the statute, the term "emergency" is defined with reference
to several different criteria that characterize an emergency. One of those
criteria is severe pain; another is the risk of organ failure or death. By anal-
ogy, one might define "winter" as a season involving cold weather and
snow. But this does not mean snow is cold weather. Apart from the syntax
of the statute, there is the problem of context. The emergency health care
benefits statute has nothing whatsoever to do with the question the OLC
lawyers set out to answer, namely when the infliction of pain is severe
enough to constitute torture. Statutory language may indeed be illuminated
by the usage of the same word in similar contexts, but it is highly implausi-
ble to consider these two statutes as having anything in common beyond the
170. OLC Memo (Aug. 1, 2002), in Tun TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO Anu GHRAIB, supra
note 26, at 172, 183.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (2006).
172. See, e.g., BRurT, supra note 26, at 243-47; GooDSMITH, supra note 25, at 144-50.
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words themselves. The lawyers' argument feels like someone went fishing
around on a computer database looking to match up the search terms with-
out using their judgment to decide whether the match was on point.
2. The Duration Requirement and the Mental/Physical Distinction
After the initial set of torture memos was leaked to the media and
roundly criticized in public, the OLC prepared a new memo on interroga-
tion, which superseded the prior analysis."' This memorandum did not rely
on the emergency health care benefits statute but nevertheless concluded
that waterboarding is permissible. It did so by creating some distinctions
and blurring others. The question for readers is, at what point does the fol-
lowing legal analysis become strained, abusive, or manipulative and there-
fore improper?
Remember that the operative language of the statute defines as torture,
and therefore prohibits, "an act . . . specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering." The OLC lawyers began by distin-
guishing between severe "pain" and severe "suffering" in Section (1) of the
statute: "[T]he question remains whether Congress intended to prohibit a
category of 'severe physical suffering' distinct from 'severe physical pain.'
We conclude that under some circumstances 'severe physical suffering'
may constitute torture even if it does not involve 'severe physical pain.'"174
This sounds like a concession, as if the lawyers are going to interpret the
category of "severe physical suffering" more broadly than the category of
"severe physical pain." In fact, however, the lawyers make this move be-
cause they want to play off the related category of "severe mental pain or
suffering": "We interpret the phrase in a statutory context where Congress
expressly distinguished 'physical pain or suffering' from 'mental pain or
suffering.' Consequently, a separate category of 'physical suffering' must
include something other than any type of 'mental pain or suffering."' It
certainly is true that the statute distinguishes physical and mental pain and
suffering. The term "physical pain or suffering" is undefined, but the term
"4mental pain or suffering" is defined in Section (2), as limited to the results
of four types of infliction of harm-essentially the administration of mind-
altering drugs, threats of death, torture, the administration of drugs to an-
other, or the mental suffering incidental to the infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering. So far, so good. It sounds like severe physical pain and
suffering may be a broader category than severe mental pain or suffering
because it is not limited to the suffering that results from certain enumer-
ated acts.
173. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to James B. Comey,
Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), available at news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/dojtor-
turel23004mem.pdf.
174. Id. at 10.
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Here is where the crucial analytic move happens. After drawing these
distinctions-physical pain vs. suffering and physical vs. mental pain or
suffering-the OLC lawyers blur a crucial distinction: "We conclude that
under some circumstances 'physical suffering' may be of sufficient inten-
sity and duration to meet the statutory definition of torture even if it does
not involve 'severe physical pain.' "" 5 Again, this sounds like a concession.
Maybe there is some physical suffering that is of sufficient intensity and
duration that it counts as torture, even though it may not involve the inflic-
tion of severe physical pain. Notice, however, that a crucial term has been
smuggled into this analysis. Look at the statute again. The definition of
",severe physical pain or suffering" in Section (1) has no duration require-
ment. Even the brief infliction of pain may constitute torture. The definition
in Section (2) of severe mental pain or suffering, by contrast, has a duration
element-it means "the prolonged mental harm" caused by one of the four
enumerated acts. Now, by lawyerly sleight of hand, the duration term is
moved into Section (1) and used to modify "physical pain or suffering":
"To constitute such torture, 'severe physical suffering' would have to be a
condition of some extended duration or persistence as well as intensity.""
What justifies this move? As far as one can tell, nothing. The lawyers seem
to be playing a shell game, moving around statutory terms and distinctions
like physical and mental, pain and suffering, and duration, hoping that the
reader will get lost in the analysis and think it only reasonable that short-
term physical suffering cannot constitute torture. This matters because
waterboarding, because it is so agonizing, is over very quickly."' Most
subjects do not last more than a minute before begging for the treatment to
end. If the OLC lawyers are correct in their statutory analysis, this would
not be torture.
If there were any doubt of the importance of this analysis, consider the
testimony of the head of OLC, Stephen Bradbury, before Congress in Feb-
ruary of 2008. In response to a question about waterboarding, Bradbury
responded that an interrogation technique is not torture if it is
[S]ubject to strict safeguards, limitations and conditions [it] does
not involve severe physical pain or severe physical suffering-
and severe physical suffering, we said on our December 2004
Opinion, has to take account of both the intensity of the discom-
fort or distress involved and the duration. Something can be quite
distressing or uncomfortable, even frightening, but if it doesn't
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id.
177. In an ironic illustration of the duration and intensity of waterboarding, a conservative talk
radio host in Chicago who subjected himself to the technique lasted six or seven seconds before
insisting that it be discontinued. He subsequently reported, "[i]t is way worse than I thought it
would be . . . and I don't want to say this: absolutely torture." Ryan Pollyea, Mancow
Waterboarded, Admits It's Torture, NBC CHICAGO (May 22, 2009, 12:11 PM), www.nbcchicago.
com/news/local/Mancow-Takes-on-Waterboarding-and-Loses.html.
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involve severe physical pain and it doesn't last very long, it may
not constitute severe physical suffering."'
In addition to the euphemizing (people who have been subjected to
waterboarding would describe it as involving something much worse than
"discomfort or distress"), the analysis depends on the duration term. Brad-
bury also assumed that most citizens, and even lawyers, who had been fol-
lowing the debate over waterboarding would not go back and read the
statute carefully. On a cursory reading, the argument seems plausible. The
duration requirement does appear in the statute. The problem is, it appears
only to modify "mental pain or suffering." Because waterboarding involves
physical pain or suffering, of very short duration, it was essential that the
lawyers incorporate the duration requirement into the definition of physical
suffering. If they could establish that short-term physical suffering is not
torture, they could provide a green light to American officials to engage in
waterboarding. This is just what they did, and the result is that several de-
tainees were repeatedly subjected to this treatment.
The question for readers is whether this legal analysis is plausible. I
have argued that it is not, but some may disagree. The point of this demon-
stration is not to reargue the case against the OLC lawyers but to use this
example to show what it would mean to unpack the ethics of lawyers in
terms of the craft of legal reasoning. The arguments raised here depend on
the sorts of considerations that lawyers take into account when evaluating
legal arguments. For example, relying on the syntax of a statute to deter-
mine the meaning of a term is a perfectly ordinary technique of legal inter-
pretation. It is also part of the everyday process of evaluating legal
arguments to note that a statute chosen to illuminate the meaning of a term
is relevantly different in context and, thus, that it does not shed light on the
meaning of the statutory language. In other words, there is nothing mysteri-
ous about this analysis. It is what all lawyers do when they conclude, "that's
a lousy argument," when they think a court's statement of reasons is inade-
quate to support its judgment or when they respond to an opponent's brief.
The craft of making and evaluating legal arguments is what lawyers do; it is
not a separate skill that belongs to a separate mode of inquiry called "legal
ethics." As law teachers, we teach the craft of ethical lawyering whenever
we subject to critical scrutiny the arguments of a judicial opinion or a stu-
dent's response to a hypothetical.
The trouble is, references to craft standards have a way of sounding
like a theoretical black box to one outside the craft. Donald Schan presents
two case studies from professional education, one from architecture and
another from psychotherapy, to illustrate how experienced professionals ap-
178. Testimony of Steven G. Bradbury: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 129 (2008) (state-
ment of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice).
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ply their knowledge to specific problems.' 7 9 These teachers make use of "a
repertoire of examples, images, understandings, and actions" to solve the
problems on which their students are stuck, and they see something in the
situation that is already present.1 so Quoting Thomas Kuhn, Schon empha-
sizes that the perception of similarities between a problem situation and past
experience is "both logically and psychologically prior to any of the numer-
ous criteria by which that same identification might have been made.""' It
may be difficult to articulate criteria of similarities and differences in pro-
fessional judgment, but that difficulty does not mean judgment is arbitrary.
Rather, it is sufficiently complex to resist description in terms of something
else but nevertheless governed by recognized, objective standards. A differ-
ent teacher of architecture or psychotherapy would presumably react to
these case studies with an understanding of what the teacher was trying to
get the student to see. But the point about priority is important: "It would be
a mistake to attribute to the inquirer at the beginning of such a process the
articulated description which he achieves later on." 182 An articulated
description is possible, but that articulation does not determine the exercise
of professional judgment. It is a retrospective explanation of a judgment
that, at the time, was made intuitively and based on experience and training.
The torture example is offered in the spirit of Schin's case studies. Just as
an experienced architect would presumably find the student's initial design
inadequate, an experienced lawyer should have an intuitive reaction that the
OLC arguments are inadequate. Pressed to explain, the lawyer should be
able to articulate something like the analysis given above. Craft standards
do exist, even if experienced lawyers largely make tacit reliance upon them.
CONCLUSION
The Carnegie Report is exactly right in its criticism of a stance of
detached objectivity that legal education sometimes engenders toward law.
There is nothing wrong with evaluating legal rules for their efficiency or in
terms of the incentives they create, but understanding law from this external
point of view is not primarily what lawyers do in practice. Practitioners do
not study law, they do law, and like many complex activities (playing a
musical instrument, designing buildings, laying bricks, etc.), lawyering can
be done well or badly. This evaluation implicitly makes reference to the end
for which the practice is constituted. I have argued that the law grounds a
distinction between the rightful exercise of power and raw power and thus
enables citizens to arrange their affairs with reference to an agreed upon
social framework of cooperation. If this goal, or something like it, indeed
179. See SCHON, Trin R ETIErv PRACTITIONER, supra note 9, at 76-127.
180. Id. at 138.
181. Id. at 139 (quoting Thomas Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE ESSENTIAL
TE.NSION 307 (1977)).
182. Id. at 140.
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identifies the end for which the legal system is constituted, then it follows
that there is a reasoning process by which one may differentiate between
valid conclusions of law and faux legal justifications, such as the one of-
fered by the OLC lawyers in support of the permission to engage in
waterboarding. Teaching legal ethics is therefore inextricably bound up
with teaching legal reasoning. The law of lawyering may be its own subject,
with all of the technical complexity one would expect from any well-devel-
oped body of law, but legal ethics is nothing more than doing what lawyers
do, and doing it well.
